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POLICE FUNDING 
Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski* 
Abstract 
A number of civil rights activists have called for the defunding or 
abolition of American police departments. These activists claim that the 
United States overinvests in police, leaving fewer scarce resources to 
support other government services. Activists also claim that 
overinvestment in policing contributes to higher rates of police 
misconduct and unnecessary criminalization, particularly in communities 
of color. 
This Article considers these calls for the defunding of police. It 
ultimately cautions against widespread defunding of police and offers an 
alternative proposal. Part I brings together multiple national databases on 
local government expenditures to evaluate empirically how states and 
municipalities fund policing. It shows that local police funding varies 
remarkably across jurisdictions. Much of this variation exists because 
police departments derive funding primarily from local sales and property 
taxes. Because of this funding mechanism, economically disadvantaged 
communities most in need of public-safety services can often least afford 
them.  
Part II argues that the defunding of police departments on a wide scale 
may have significant and unintended consequences. This Article argues 
that defunding could increase crime rates, hamper efforts to control 
officer misconduct, and reduce officer safety. Faced with smaller 
budgets, defunded agencies may also seek additional revenue through 
potentially harmful means like excessive ticketing and civil asset 
forfeitures. Defunding could push the delivery of public-safety services 
to the private sector. And defunded agencies may ultimately lower officer 
salaries, thereby limiting recruitment and retention of qualified 
personnel.  
Given these drawbacks, this Article remains skeptical that defunding 
will improve policing in many jurisdictions. Instead, this Article argues 
that states should fundamentally reimagine how they fund the police. 
States should view policing as a public good that ought to be equitably 
distributed across the population according to need. Just as some state 
legislatures have passed revenue-sharing initiatives designed to equalize 
the availability of public goods such as education, so too should states act 
to equalize the funding of local police departments according to need. 
This would ensure that all localities have minimally sufficient resources 
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to investigate crime and promote public safety regardless of the strength 
of the local tax base. Additionally, to ensure the quality of policing 
services, states should require that each local police department earmark 
a specified percentage of its budget for officer training and 
accountability. Combined, these regulations of police funding could 
ensure that localities have sufficient resources to promote the public good 
without drawing limited resources away from other community 
initiatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an extensive 
investigation of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) at the request of 
former Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan.1 Over a year later, the 
 
 1. Sari Horwitz et al., Justice Department Will Investigate Practices of Chicago Police, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2015/12/06/justice-department-will-launch-investigation-into-practices-of-chicago-police 
[https://perma.cc/UG6X-T29Y] (“On the same day that [former Chicago Police Commissioner] 
McCarthy was fired, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan wrote a letter to the DOJ urging 
them to open an investigation into the police department.”). The investigation began after a county 
judge ordered the city to release dashcam footage showing then-Chicago officer Jason Van Dyke 
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DOJ issued a 161-page report concluding that the CPD was engaged in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct in violation of federal 
law.2 The DOJ found that CPD officers regularly used excessive force 
against suspects,3 failed to implement crisis-intervention or de-escalation 
techniques,4 relied on deficient accountability systems,5 and lacked 
adequate supervision.6  
But one of the most glaring problems identified by the DOJ report was 
the CPD’s failure to properly train its officers. As the report explained, 
the CPD failed to “provide officers or supervisors with adequate 
training,” resulting in officers that were “unprepared to police lawfully 
and effectively” and supervisors “who d[id] not mentor or support 
constitutional policing by officers.”7 For example, the DOJ found that the 
CPD used a thirty-five-year-old video to teach officers about use of force, 
created before the United States Supreme Court issued some of the most 
integral decisions on the topic.8 The video was not only legally outdated, 
it was also inconsistent with the use-of-force standard articulated in the 
 
shooting seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald sixteen times in fifteen seconds without apparent 
justification. Id. (noting the McDonald shooting video release as a motivating factor in Madigan’s 
letter to the DOJ and the subsequent DOJ investigation); see also Nausheen Husain, Laquan 
McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, the Verdict and the Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 
2019, 7:22 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-
mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Y7DZ-UHUK] (stating that 
Van Dyke shot McDonald sixteen times in fourteen to fifteen seconds, with McDonald lying on 
the ground for thirteen of those seconds). As the DOJ later noted, the killing of McDonald was 
merely “a tipping point—igniting longstanding concerns about CPD officers’ use of force, and 
the City’s systems for detecting and correcting the unlawful use of force.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/9LRN-J2US]. Protestors filled Chicago streets in the 
days after the release of the video demanding reform and accountability. See Laura Thoren, 
Protestors Gather After Police Shooting Video Released, ABC 7 CHI. (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://abc7chicago.com/news/protesters-gather-after-police-shooting-video-released/1098346 
[https://perma.cc/3T2X-QGJQ]. 
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 23.  
 3. Id. at 22–37 (concluding that the CPD used deadly force in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, used less-lethal force unjustifiably, and engaged in a broader pattern of unlawful 
force).  
 4. Id. at 37–46 (finding that the CPD’s newly implemented de-escalation training and other 
similar policy revisions should be expanded and that the CPD has historically failed to provide 
officers with adequate crisis-intervention training).  
 5. Id. at 46–92 (providing extensive details on how Chicago does not have adequate 
systems in place to investigate police conduct, investigations of officers are rarely fair and 
complete, and the CPD lacks proper policies to prevent officers from deliberately concealing 
misconduct, and recommending various policy changes to address these accountability issues).  
 6. Id. at 93–133 (discussing the failure to implement adequate training, supervision, and 
promotion procedures that may hurt officer wellness).  
 7. Id. at 10.  
 8. Id. at 95 (“The tactics depicted in the video were clearly out of date with commonly 
accepted police standards of today.”). 
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CPD’s own internal policies.9 And the DOJ even observed one officer 
asleep during the training.10 Unsurprisingly, the DOJ found that only one 
in six officers that it interviewed “came close to properly articulating the 
legal standard for use of force.”11 This poor training protocol failed to 
“weed out low-performing recruits,” resulting in unqualified officers 
policing Chicago streets—many of whom went through little formal 
training thereafter.12 Additionally, the DOJ found that the CPD’s physical 
training facilities were in disrepair.13 The facilities lacked sufficient space 
to train the thousands of officers that used them each year,14 and these 
facilities were woefully understaffed to meet the growing demand.15  
For the CPD to curb its pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, the 
DOJ concluded that Chicago needed to substantially increase its 
investment in officer training.16 Soon thereafter, former Chicago Mayor 
Rahm Emanuel announced that the city would spend an estimated $95 
million to build a state-of-the-art training facility to be shared by the 
police and fire departments.17 This new 500,000 square feet facility, 
located on a thirty-acre site in one of the most economically 
disadvantaged areas of Chicago,18 will include a shooting range, 
 
 9. Id.  
 10. Compounding this, the DOJ noted that “[s]everal recruits were not paying attention” 
and there appeared to be “minimal” efforts made to engage students during this lesson. Id. The 
instructor started the class ten minutes late and ended the class twenty minutes early. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Brandon E. Patterson, A $95 Million, State-of-the-Art Police Academy is Chicago’s 
Latest Political Battleground, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/ 
crime-justice/2017/12/chicago-political-battleground-95-million-police-training-academy-rahm-
emanuel-chance-rapper [https://perma.cc/H7PS-2YJT]. 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 103. Perhaps no story better illustrates the level 
of disrepair and carelessness than one anecdote about the storage of ammunition and firearms by 
the CPD. The DOJ found that the CPD kept guns and ammunitions in a dilapidated former school 
building. Id. at 103–04. The armory room, a former school office, was left unlocked with loaded 
guns left out in the open in close proximity to training guns. Id. There were no labels or controls 
to keep officers from mistakenly grabbing a gun with a live round when they intended to grab a 
training gun. Id. at 104.  
 14. Id. at 103–04 (providing examples of how this space was insufficient for the needs of a 
large police department).  
 15. Id. (discussing that the city’s stated desire to hire 1,000 new officers would “require the 
Education and Training Division to run huge classes through the Academy each month” and 
explaining that “[t]he Division does not have sufficient personnel” to do this).  
 16. Id. 
 17. John Byrne, Mayor Rahm Emanuel Announces Next Step in Police Academy Project, A 
Plan that Continues to Draw Criticism, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.chicago 
tribune.com/politics/ct-met-rahm-emanuel-police-academy-20181116-story.html [https://perma 
.cc/N5CC-HHE6]. 
 18. See Fran Spielman, Plan Commission Approves $95 Million Police and Fire Training 
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designated space for officers to conduct simulated training scenarios, and 
a driving training course.19 Chicago officials have also promised to 
allocate the necessary resources to use this facility to properly train new 
recruits and provide regular in-service training for officers currently on 
the force.20  
Almost immediately after this announcement, local civil rights 
activists criticized Emanuel’s plan. Black Lives Matter and other civil 
rights activist groups “repeatedly . . . filled the corridors [of] City Hall 
with chants of ‘No cop academy!’”21 At one point, protestors blocked 
access to City Hall elevators and occupied the building for nearly ten 
hours.22 According to these protestors, the new police academy would not 
solve the department’s systemic misconduct problem; instead, they 
argued that the investment in the police academy would siphon limited 
resources away from the local school system, mental health services, and 
community programs.23 A website by some of these activists lays out a 
thoughtful and compelling case against spending an additional $95 
million on a new training facility for police and fire personnel.24 It argues: 
“We demand a redirecting of this $95 million into Chicago’s most 
marginalized communities instead. Real community safety comes from 
fully funded schools and mental health centers, robust after-school and 
job-training programs, and social and economic justice. We want 
investment in our communities, not expanded resources for police.”25  
This ongoing debate in Chicago underscores a broader movement 
among civil rights activists across the country. In the wake of highly 
publicized and deadly encounters between police and civilians in cities 
 
 19. See Heather Cherone, Rahm Pushes Plan to Spend $95 Million on New Police, Fire 
Training Academy Through Divided City Council, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:13 PM), 
https://blockclubchicago.org/2019/03/13/emanuel-pushes-plan-to-spend-95-million-on-new-
police-fire-training-academy-through-divided-city-council/ [https://perma.cc/79RX-AB82]. 
 20. John Byrne, New Police, Fire Training Facility set for West Side, CHI. TRIB. (July 3, 
2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-police-fire-training-met-201 
70703-story.html [https://perma.cc/P8Y8-7SW5]. 
 21. See Bryne, supra note 17.  
 22. See Cherone, supra note 19.  
 23. See Patterson, supra note 12 (“This and other organizations have also staged protests 
and testified at city council hearings, arguing that the money would be far better spent on the 
city’s cash-strapped school system, mental health services, and community programs the activists 
say will help reduce violence in West Garfield Park and elsewhere—thereby reducing the need 
for police intervention.”).  
 24. About, NO COP ACAD., https://nocopacademy.com/about [https://perma.cc/BC7Q-
69M7].  
 25. Id.  
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like Baltimore,26 Cleveland,27 Ferguson,28 and countless others, policy 
makers have searched for answers to a perceived national epidemic of 
police misconduct. Many policy makers have responded by promising to 
allocate additional funds to officer training and accountability efforts29 
and have made costly investments into technologies such as officer body 
cameras.30 Nevertheless, some critics believe that these investments 
fundamentally misunderstand the root causes of police violence in the 
United States.31 In fact, “[o]ne of the most [controversial portions] of the 
Black Lives Matter movement’s platform is the idea of divesting from 
police departments.”32 A website associated with the group describes 
local and federal investments in policing as “investments in the 
criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people.”33 There are simply 
too many police officers, they argue, given discretionary authority to 
enforce criminal laws in an uneven way that disproportionately 
 
 26. See Kevin Rector, The 45-Minute Mystery of Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 
25, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-gray-ticker-20150425-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6HJ9-E4YT] (describing the death of Freddie Gray); see also German Lopez, 
The Baltimore Protests over Freddie Gray’s Death, Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2016/ 
7/27/18089352/freddie-gray-baltimore-riots-police-violence [https://perma.cc/84TC-HEFW] (last 
updated Aug. 18, 2016, 9:38 AM) (noting that the death of Freddie Gray led to protests and an 
investigation of the Baltimore Police Department).  
 27. Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown of the Events that Led to the 12-Year-
Old’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/ 
2017/01/tamir_rice_shooting_a_breakdow.html [https://perma.cc/7XX4-6NYB] (providing a 
summary of the events leading to the killing of Tamir Rice, which happened shortly before the 
DOJ issued its investigatory findings of the Cleveland Police Department).  
 28. Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/4G9T-D45M] (describing 
how the killing of Michael Brown spurred mass protests in Ferguson and a broader national 
conversation about police violence). 
 29. See Gene Johnson & Eric Tucker, After Ferguson, A Push for More ‘De-Escalation’ 
Training, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/ 
2014/11/29/after-ferguson-some-push-for-more-escalation-police-training/HtXM7gUmKYT9F 
x1Qwd8PxL/story.html [https://perma.cc/MA29-NAK2]. 
 30. See Bram Sable-Smith, After Ferguson, Police Body Cameras Catching On, NPR (Nov. 
12, 2014, 5:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/11/12/363547611/after-ferguson-police-body-
cameras-catching-on [https://perma.cc/89ZQ-CWHF] (describing the sometimes “huge” cost of 
investing in police-oversight technologies such as body cameras, particularly for cash-strapped 
departments, and saying that “the attention generated by events in Ferguson may force other 
departments to make some difficult tradeoffs”). 
 31. See, e.g., About, supra note 24. 
 32. Brentin Mock, The Price of Defunding the Police, CITYLAB (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/the-price-of-defunding-the-police/533232 [https:// 
perma.cc/3S7L-8F82] (calling the diversion of funds from police departments to communities 
“[o]ne of the most contested” parts of the platform). 
 33. Invest-Divest, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/invest-divest/ 
[https://perma.cc/3J5X-CSAH]. 
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criminalizes poorer communities of color.34 To address the root causes of 
police misconduct, they argue that we must disinvest from policing 
altogether and, instead, reallocate many of these resources towards 
supporting the community.35 Supporters of this viewpoint have described 
this position as the defunding or even the abolition of policing as we 
know it.36 To further support this position, a coalition of dozens of 
prominent racial justice groups issued a careful analysis of police 
spending in twelve large American jurisdictions, ultimately favoring a 
broad disinvestment from punitive criminal justice systems like local 
police departments.37   
While this viewpoint is gaining traction among activists and some 
academics,38 it has received comparatively less attention by legal 
scholars. Legal scholars have extensively analyzed how the law can 
combat misconduct by police officers.39 In many cases, though, this 
conversation is somewhat detached from a broader understanding of how 
we fund policing in the United States and how funding influences officer 
accountability and public safety.40 This Article considers these growing 
calls for the defunding of police and more generally considers the 
relationship between funding and the delivery of policing services. 
 
 34. See id.; see also Mock, supra note 32 (providing a detailed summary of this growing 
movement). 
 35. See Invest-Divest, supra note 33.  
 36. Maya Dukmasova, Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It’s Less Crazy than It Sounds, 
CHI. READER (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-abolitionist-
movement-alternatives-cops-chicago/Content?oid=23289710 [https://perma.cc/FD3B-5GVN] 
(describing how a group of activists in Chicago and elsewhere support the abolition of policing). 
 37. KATE HAMAJI ET AL., CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM TO THRIVE: 
REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR COMMUNITIES 1 (2017), https://populardemocracy.org/ 
sites/default/files/Freedom%20To%20Thrive%2C%20Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9DJM-WU3H]. 
 38. Perhaps one of the most persuasive articulations of this position among academics was 
written by Professor Alex Vitale. See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 4 (2017). This Article 
is not a response to Vitale’s excellent, detailed, and nuanced book. Instead, it is simply mentioned 
here as an example of a particularly compelling piece of scholarship by a noteworthy academic 
supporting a position similar to the activists discussed in the Introduction. This Article is not 
meant to be refutation of these broader academic positions. In fact, the Authors agree with much 
of the scholarship in this field. Rather, this Article offers three unique contributions to the existing 
literature: (1) it explores the extent of inequality in the funding of local law enforcement agencies 
across the country; (2) it offers an account of the likely drawbacks of widespread disinvestment 
that policy makers must consider before moving forward with such initiatives; and (3) it offers an 
alternative proposal for how the United States can rethink changes to police funding that the 
Authors believe responds to the widespread inequality that currently exists, in a manner that 
hopefully will avoid some of the drawbacks of widespread defunding.  
 39. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 878–79 (2015). 
 40. Some of the best literature on the funding of American police departments, at least at 
the federal level, comes from the excellent work of Professor Rachel Harmon. See id. at 948–49.  
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Principally, this Article argues that adequate funding represents an 
integral part of a successful police department. It ultimately cautions 
against the widespread defunding of the police and offers an alternative 
approach to address some of the legitimate concerns raised by defunding 
advocates.   
Part I empirically evaluates how states and municipalities fund local 
law enforcement. To do this, this Article brings together multiple national 
datasets on police expenditures. It discovers not a problem of general 
overfunding of police departments but, instead, evidence of massive 
inequality in police funding from one jurisdiction to the next.41 Take as 
an example the 109 separate police departments within Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania.42 Some residents of Allegheny County are served 
by police officers working full time, earning an average of $71,000 a 
year.43 Other residents in this same county are served only by part-time 
officers who are paid around $10 an hour—less than employees at the 
nearby Walmart.44 The best-staffed police departments in the county have 
ten times as many officers per capita than the county’s poorest 
communities.45 And perhaps most importantly, the communities with the 
highest crime and greatest need for public-safety services are often the 
ones with the fewest and least-paid officers.46 As this Article’s analysis 
shows, Allegheny County is not the exception but the rule. All across the 
country, massive inequality in the funding of local police departments 
means that individuals receive drastically different levels of public-safety 
services.47 Much of this variation exists because police departments 
derive funding primarily from local sales and property taxes.48 Because 
of this funding mechanism, the most economically disadvantaged 
 
 41. Shelly Bradbury, At Local Police Departments, Inequality Abounds, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Dec. 18, 2018), https://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/blog/allegheny-county-
police-departments-inequality-budgets [https://perma.cc/3U5R-MXLM] (stating that “inequality 
abounds”).  
 42. Id. (“High-paid, low-paid, full-time, part-time, experienced, inexperienced, well-
equipped or poorly equipped—it’s a roll of the geographic dice, according to an analysis by the 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette . . . .”). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.; see also Walmart Cashier/Sales Hourly Sales in Pennsylvania, INDEED, 
https://www.indeed.com/salaries/Cashier/Sales-Salaries-at-Walmart,-Pennsylvania 
[https://perma.cc/23JL-5BKN] (showing that the average Walmart cashier in that area made over 
$10 per hour). 
 45. Bradbury, supra note 41.  
 46. Id. (“[P]olice officers in Allegheny County who face the highest crime and poverty rates 
in their communities are also typically the lowest paid . . . . Officers don’t stay as long in 
communities with lower pay, and in three of the lowest-paying departments, the average officer 
has been on the job [for] only a year.”).  
 47. See infra Part I (providing details on the extent of inequality in police departments 
across the country).  
 48. See infra Part I.  
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communities most in need of public-safety services can often least afford 
them. As this Article argues, this realization complicates calls for the 
defunding of police. This Article’s analysis reveals widespread inequality 
in American police departments—some well-funded and some 
underfunded—often in a manner that bears no real relationship to the kind 
of public-safety challenges faced in each respective community.    
Part II argues that, given the findings discussed above, the widespread 
defunding of police departments would likely have significant and 
unintended consequences in many communities. In fact, this Article 
argues that adequate funding is often a necessary condition for the 
delivery of quality policing services. Consistent with a growing body of 
empirical literature, this Article argues that defunding could increase 
crime rates in a manner that disproportionately affects communities of 
color. Defunding could also reduce officer safety and hamper efforts to 
control officer wrongdoing, including the ability to properly train, 
oversee, investigate, and discipline officers suspected of professional 
misconduct. Further, history suggests that police departments facing 
budget shortfalls often do not necessarily reduce coercive behavior but, 
instead, seek additional revenue through potentially harmful means like 
excessive ticketing or civil asset forfeitures.49 And defunded agencies 
may ultimately lower officer salaries, thereby limiting recruitment of 
qualified personnel.50 Combined, these potential drawbacks ought to give 
policy makers pause before they adopt widespread defunding efforts.  
Instead, Part III offers an alternative proposal for how policy makers 
could fundamentally reimagine the funding of local police departments 
to address some (although admittedly not all) of the important concerns 
expressed by defunding and abolition supporters. Central to the argument 
made by many defunding supporters is the belief that communities spend 
comparatively too much of their local budgets on policing relative to 
other social services and educational needs.51 For example, as one recent 
report highlighted, some communities such as Oakland spend as much as 
41% of their general fund on policing—far outpacing their expenditures 
on other community resources and services—while others such as New 
York have the resources to spend as little as 8% of their general fund 
expenditures on policing.52 But this is largely because New York collects 
substantially more tax money.53 New York and Oakland actually spend 
 
 49. See infra Section II.C. 
 50. See infra Section II.D. 
 51. See infra Part III. 
 52. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37, at 2.  
 53. Cf. Tonya Moreno, A List of State Income Tax Rates, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/state-income-tax-rates-3193320 [https://perma.cc/QLT8-QVFB] 
(last updated Nov. 22, 2019) (comparing the top marginal tax rates among states and 
demonstrating that New York has high marginal tax rates).   
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almost the same amount of money ($581 and $594 per capita, 
respectively) on policing services each year.54 Because of the wealth 
inequality between the two cities, and because each city must pay for its 
police department primarily through local taxes, Oakland is forced to 
spend more of its limited resources on policing, leaving fewer resources 
available for other community services.  
It is this inequality that frequently undermines the delivery of quality 
policing services and leads to many economically disadvantaged 
communities siphoning off resources from other social services to 
support policing. To remedy this, this Article contends that states should 
view policing as a public good to be equitably distributed across the 
population according to need. Just as many state legislatures have passed 
revenue-sharing initiatives designed to somewhat equalize the 
availability of public goods such as education, so too should states act to 
equalize the funding of local police departments according to need. This 
would ensure that all localities have sufficient resources to investigate 
crime and promote public safety regardless of the strength of the local tax 
base. This may also begin to correct for the massive inequality that 
currently exists between American police departments.  
Further, to ensure the quality of policing services in all jurisdictions, 
this Article argues that states should require that each local police 
department earmark a specified percentage of its budget for officer 
accountability. Thus, for example, rather than allowing police 
departments to invest all of their budgets into officers engaged in coercive 
actions like ticketing, investigatory stops, and arrests, each community 
would have to invest a specified percentage of their budget into 
overseeing, investigating, and disciplining officers that engage in 
misconduct. Combined, these state regulations of police funding would 
ensure that localities have sufficient resources to promote the public good 
while leaving enough for other community initiatives.  
I.  THE FUNDING OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT   
Before critically assessing the calls for defunding police departments, 
it is first important to understand the funding of local police departments. 
Law enforcement agencies are a heterogeneous group, ranging from tiny 
county sheriff offices in small rural communities to mighty police 
departments in dense urban areas with millions of residents.55 Some 
departments are able to spend lavishly on, for example, technology such 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. See Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Police Executive Opinions of Legal 
Regulation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1841, 1861 (2018). 
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as helicopters56 and even foreign intelligence operations.57 Others must 
make do with more modest means, sometimes at the cost of shutting 
down basic operations.58 This variation exists, in part, because most 
police departments receive the brunt of their funding from local taxpayers 
(primarily local sales and property taxes), with smaller additions from 
state grants and smaller additions still from federal programs.59 But again, 
there is massive variation and inequality in funding sources.60   
This Part presents a descriptive account of law enforcement agency 
funding across the country. It focuses on the salaries of law enforcement 
officers, per capita expenditures on law enforcement salaries, and 
reliance on part-time officers. These areas were chosen because they are 
most closely and directly connected to the normative debates surrounding 
defunding police agencies, effective policing, and police misconduct. 
This Part’s aim is to highlight the geographic variation in police funding 
and expenditures. Funding, salaries, and reliance on part-time workers 
varies drastically from one jurisdiction to the next.61 The portrait of police 
funding that emerges is one of massive inequality.  
A.  Data and Methodology 
The data in this Part comes from two sources that are combined to 
draw a nationwide portrait of police funding across more than 20,000 law 
enforcement departments, more than 3,000 counties and county 
 
 56. See, e.g., Chase Cook, $5.5 Million Ask: Anne Arundel Police Make Case for a New 
Helicopter, CAP. GAZETTE (May 24, 2019), https://www.capitalgazette.com/politics/ac-cn-
county-helicopter-20190525-story.html [https://perma.cc/2RH7-FW8W].  
 57. See, e.g., Ali Winston, Stationed Overseas, but Solving Crimes in New York City, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyregion/terrorism-nypd-
intelligence-crime.html [https://perma.cc/34UV-QFL8] (noting that the New York City Police 
Department has “14 New York detectives posted overseas as part of a longstanding 
counterterrorism program”).  
 58. See, e.g., Associated Press, Sheriff Suspends Law Enforcement Due to Lack of Funding, 
WKYT (Feb. 9, 2019, 11:53 AM), https://www.wkyt.com/content/news/Sheriff-suspends-law-
enforcement-due-to-lack-of-funding-505613111.html [https://perma.cc/QJ6M-J2PR] (“A 
Kentucky sheriff has told the local fiscal court he is suspending all law enforcement activities 
because of lack of funding.”); Antonia Noori Farzan, An Oklahoma Sheriff Quit in Protest over 
Dangerous Jail Conditions. So Did All the Deputies., WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:11 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/20/an-oklahoma-sheriff-quit-protest-over-
dangerous-jail-conditions-so-did-all-deputies [https://perma.cc/UE85-R8SJ] (“Budget shortfalls 
also meant that the department didn’t have any carbon monoxide detectors.”). 
 59. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37, at 3, 5. 
 60. Id. at 2. 
 61. See id. at 1 (noting disparities in police funding and spending across twelve different 
jurisdictions in the country). 
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equivalents, and many thousand more sub-county government units.62 
The first source of data derives from the Annual Survey of Governments 
(ASG) from the U.S. Census Bureau.63 The purpose of the survey is to 
collect “on a nationwide scale . . . data on [government] revenues, 
expenditures, debt and assets of counties, cities, township governments, 
special districts and dependent agencies.”64 The survey has been 
administered since 1957.65 A full census of local governments has been 
conducted every five years (in years ending in “2” and “7”).66 A full 
census has a target population of over 90,000 government units.67 
Between full-survey years, the Census Bureau conducts partial surveys 
based on samples.68 All government units included (either in the partial-
sample or full-sample years) receive an initial mail out, numerous 
reminders, and telephone follow-up calls.69 Survey forms are available 
online.70 Response rates tend to be exceptional and far beyond what 
 
 62. To the Authors’ knowledge, no legal scholarship has brought these data sources into 
dialogue with each other within the context of police funding. A word of caution for future 
researchers: obtaining, parsing, consolidating, cleaning, and joining these data is painful and takes 
time.  
 63. See Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go0400.html [https://perma.cc/4WUN-6FRZ].  
 64. See About the Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documen 
tation/methodology/2016/2016%20Methodology%20Document%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DHA8-HD9Z].  
 65. Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/about.html [https://perma.cc/EJP2-5FXZ]. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“The target population consists of all 50 state governments, the District of 
Columbia, and all active local governmental units (counties, cities, townships, special districts).  
There were over 90,000 such units in the current survey year.”). 
 68. Id. It is also worth noting that the sampling is not random. For example, county 
governments with populations of 100,000 or more are always sampled. See id. Similarly, cities 
and towns with populations of 75,000 or more are also included in the sample. Id. The yearly 
sample size is typically above 10,000 government units. Id. The result of this approach is that 
some government units are necessarily surveyed every year; some only every five years; and 
others two, three, or four times in a five-year period.  
 69. See Message Requesting Survey Participation, Steven D. Dillingham, Dir., U.S. Census 
Bureau (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-
documentation/questionnaires/historical-forms/2018/alfin_l1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8W2-RV82]; 
see also About the Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, supra note 64 (explaining 
frequency and mode of contact). 
 70. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES: COUNTY, MUNICIPAL, AND TOWNSHIP 1 (2018), https://www2. 
census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documentation/questionnaires/historical-
forms/2018/f28_2018_blank.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLB6-2PGE] (worksheet F-28); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 
MULTI-FUNCTION SPECIAL AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-
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academic researchers could hope for even if they had the resources to 
survey that many government units year after year.71 Not surprisingly, the 
ASG has been used extensively by researchers in many fields.72 
The Census Bureau provides the data online as ASCII fixed-length 
text files.73 The Authors began by downloading the ASG for 2012–2016 
(the last year for which data was available at the time of this writing).74 
The Authors then parsed the ASCII file into a long-form data frame for 
ease of use.75 Next, they adjusted dollar expenditures by inflation for each 
year to make them comparable.76 The Authors did not adjust expenditures 
by cost-of-living indexes. They then averaged the numbers across all 
years. This prevents this Article from making longitudinal claims but 
reduces the risk that outlier years overpower the analysis.  
The Authors followed a similar approach with the second source of 
data: the Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll (ASPEP). It 
“provides state and local government data on full-time and part-time 
employment, part-time hours worked, full-time equivalent employment, 
and payroll statistics by governmental function.”77 The Authors focused 
on the government functions encapsulated by “police protection” and 
“correction.” ASPEP follows a similar data-acquisition approach as the 
 
finances/technical-documentation/questionnaires/historical-forms/2018/f29_2018_blank.pdf?# 
[https://perma.cc/P8GC-B4ZQ] (worksheet F-29); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 




 71. See 2016 State and Local Total Quantity Response Rates by State for Expenditure, 
Revenue, Debt, Asset, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-
finances/technical-documentation/methodology/2016/statenlocaltqrr16.xlsx [https://perma.cc/ 
CMR5-62Y2] (reporting nationwide response rates beyond 95%). 
 72. See, e.g., Ronald C. Fisher & Leslie E. Papke, Local Government Responses to 
Education Grants, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 153, 154 (2000); Angela K. Gore, The Effects of GAAP 
Regulation and Bond Market Interaction on Local Government Disclosure, 23 J. ACCT. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23, 24 (2004); Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of 
Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 790 (1998).  
 73. See Instructions for Saving/Using ASCIII Files, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 15, 1999), 
https://www.census.gov/econ/www/instrasci.html [https://perma.cc/JXZ4-GKBN]. 
 74. Other researchers might decide to include more years, but the Authors decided against 
including years beyond the last full survey of government units (in 2012) to keep the findings 
more closely tethered to current conditions. 
 75. The Census Bureau bundles the technical documentation necessary for parsing the 
ASCII file with the data for each year. See About the Annual Survey of Local Government 
Finances, supra note 64. 
 76. The Authors used the official Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation numbers. Others are 
comparable for this Article’s purposes.  
 77. See Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll (ASPEP): About, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/about.html [https://perma.cc/JY2L-
J3A7] (last updated June 5, 2019). 
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ASG.78 Response rates are similarly good.79 ASPEP follows its own 
sampling strategy.80   
There are a couple of points to stress about this data. These datasets 
represent a significant trade-off in favor of scale over nuance. The 
strength of these data sources is that they are national in scale and, as 
such, present a broad portrait of police funding across the entire United 
States. This allows this Article to make broad geographic comparisons, 
bringing into dialogue police activities from diverse corners of the 
country. But this choice for a broad scope entails that the data is not 
detailed or attentive to local quirks and complexities.81 The Authors 
intend to identify broad themes on a national scale to inform future 
research that explores, refines, and challenges these findings in more 
circumscribed and detailed settings. 
Additionally, much of the data relies on survey responses by 
government officials. There is no reason to believe that they would lie or 
misrepresent when answering the survey. But, like all survey 
respondents, they might misunderstand instructions, misremember facts, 
or fill out surveys erroneously.82 
With these limitations in mind, this Article turns to its approach. It is 
fundamentally descriptive, rather than causal, in nature. The aim is to 
inform a normative debate with a broad national account of the state of 
police funding. This Article aims to make points at the most granular unit 
of analysis. Often, that is at the level of individual law enforcement 
 
 78. There are, however, some deviations. For example, no ASPEP was collected in 1996. 
See Data: 1996 State & Local Government Datasets, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/1996/econ/apes/annual-apes.html [https://perma.cc/2C4F-
FBJP]. 
 79. See Response Rates for the 2018 Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/technical-documentation/ 
user-notes/2018_rr_notice.pdf?# [https://perma.cc/9NNL-C9RV]. 
 80. See, e.g., 2018 Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll Methodology, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/technical-documentation/ 
methodology/18_methodology.pdf?# [https://perma.cc/3CXW-NTD3]. 
 81. For example, no doubt this Article’s data is inattentive to special informal governing 
arrangements in various counties that might mitigate or amplify the trends that this Article 
identifies. This analysis does not and cannot capture such detail. 
 82. There are suggestions in the data that this indeed happened. A few responses are simply 
not credible. Sometimes predictably so, with the answers often ten times what comparable 
jurisdictions reported, suggesting that perhaps an errand zero entered the survey form somewhere 
along the way. As the notes to the figures below indicate, the Authors removed such observations 
entirely from the analysis rather than correcting them manually. The Authors have no reason to 
believe that such removals undermine the results. On the contrary, when running the analysis 
without removing errand observations, the findings tend to be more striking.  
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agencies. However, sometimes data limitations do not allow observations 
at such a granular level.83  
This presents its own methodological challenges.84 To account for 
these challenges, all funding within a given county was aggregated. This 
approach obscures and minimizes this Article’s main point (inequality 
between departments), but the alternatives would present a misleading 
picture, unduly penalizing areas of the country where county sheriffs 
carry fewer responsibilities than elsewhere. Similarly, there are law 
enforcement agencies that span multiple counties (for example, New 
York City Police Department patrol precincts are located in five 
counties).85 State law enforcement agencies, similarly, are active in 
multiple counties.86 To account for such departments, the Authors 
disaggregated their funding by population to the counties and county 
equivalents. This method also introduces ambiguity into the analysis but, 
again, was better than alternatives that would have ignored state police 
activities and multicounty law enforcement agencies. The Authors’ 
guiding principal was to approximate, as well as possible, the typical 
policing funding in different parts of the country, keeping always in mind 
that the experience within a county in turn often varies widely.  
The maps that the Authors created reflect county-level data. The 
Authors could have drawn national maps of cities, towns, and townships, 
but they are unwieldy and uninformative because there are many 
subcounty jurisdictions and because many of them are vanishingly small. 
County-level maps, though they must be read with care, are better tools 
to show broad geographic trends in the data.87 
 
 83. For example, the Washington Post database (which Part II relies on) does not 
distinguish between different agencies and allows the Authors only to identify the counties where 
fatal incidents occurred. See infra Section II.B. As such, the Authors often had to switch to a 
county-level analysis.  
 84. In some counties there is only one law enforcement agency. See Bradbury, supra note 
41. In other counties, a county sheriff works next to multiple city police departments, harbor 
police, campus law enforcement, etc. See id. For all county-level analyses, the Authors had to 
consider the funding and expenditures of all of these departments while recognizing that, in some 
parts of the nation, sheriffs do the brunt of policing (even when there are city police departments) 
and, in others, sheriffs are less central to overall law enforcement efforts. 
 85. See Borough and Precinct Crime Statistics, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1. 
nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/borough-and-precinct-crime-stats.page [https://perma.cc/ 
H4XB-ZHXU]. 
 86. See Bradbury, supra note 41. 
 87. The Authors chose the Albers equal-area conic projection for the maps because it keeps 
distortions to a minimal for lower forty-eight United States latitudes. See Albers Equal Area 
Conic, ESRI, https://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/latest/map/projections/albers-equal-area-
conic.htm [https://perma.cc/FWH5-NFQR]. One important note on reading these maps (like many 
maps) is to keep in mind the difference between geographic area and normative importance. 
Ultimately, this Article is interested in humans, not plots of land. Maps can obscure that simple 
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B.  Police Salaries 
The descriptive work begins with a national map of average salaries 
for full-time equivalent positions.88 The map is calibrated to make 
disparities visible. Counties that feature salaries close to the national 
average are colored in grey. Counties that pay salaries higher than the 
national average are colored in increasingly darker shades of turquoise. 
Counties with salaries below the national average are colored in 
increasingly darker shades of orange. Counties where data was not 
available or insufficient are colored in white.  
 




















Figure 1 shows significant regional variation. Southern states and 
adjacent regions tend to have significantly lower average salaries for 
police officers than many areas in the northeast, the Great Lakes region, 
southern Florida, and the Pacific region. Beyond regional variation there 
is also notable intraregional variation. Islands of high-salary counties are 
surrounded by seas of low-salary areas (for example, around Oklahoma 
City). Conversely, there are a few low-salary counties near contrasting 
counties.   
 
point and sometimes lead readers to equate size with importance. Despite this danger, this Article 
uses maps because the Authors believe that geography is information rich and can show in an 
intuitive and easily readable manner connections and discontinuities. Maps, properly approached, 
are information rich and comprehensible in ways that tables and matrixes typically are not. 
 88. Later figures explore the role of part-time work more thoroughly. See infra Figures 3 & 
4.  
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As discussed more in Part II, these salary differentials may have 
serious consequences for the likelihood of officer misconduct. Salary 
differentials are likely a rough approximation of the ability of different 
counties to attract talent, retain talent, and implement disciplinary 
deterrents. For example, when one officer, who was paid approximately 
$10 an hour, “accidentally shot an innocent 13-year-old in the back,”89 
the local sheriff did not appear to conduct a serious investigation and 
ultimately chose not to terminate the officer.90 When asked about the 
incident, the sheriff remarked that, “[T]hey have a hard enough time 
getting officers to patrol the town, let alone to have a separate part of their 
office set aside that just analyzes police-involved shootings.”91  
Beyond salaries, this Article also examines police expenditures as a 
proxy for a multitude of normatively relevant questions. Expenditures, of 
course, vary drastically between counties. To make them more 
comparable, this Article measures per capita expenditures on police 
salaries. This helps determine whether some of the high-salary counties 
of Section A traded higher salaries for fewer officers or, conversely, 
whether lower-salary counties compensated by hiring many more 
officers. Per capita salary expenditures can thus be understood as a rough 
proxy for a measure of police protection that combines quantity and 
quality.  
 


















 89. Patrick Smith, What Happens When Suburban Police Departments Don’t Have Enough 
Money?, NPR (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/579778555/what-happens-when-
suburban-police-departments-dont-have-enough-money [https://perma.cc/DN3U-HYNS]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
17
Rushin and Michalski: Police Funding
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
294 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
Much like Figure 1, Figure 2 also exhibits marked regionalism. 
Numerous southern, Appalachian, Northern Plains, and noncoastal 
northeastern counties fall far below the national average. Residents in 
other counties enjoy far higher per capita expenditures. 
C.  Part-Time Officers 
Differences in the funding available to individual police departments 
also manifest themselves in the employment of full-time and part-time 
police officers.92 Law enforcement agencies might hire part-time officers 
to minimize the need to pay benefits and provide job security.93 The 
potential dangers of such costs savings are significant because part-time 
officers may not be as well situated to keep up with the stressful and 
demanding requirements of police work as well-paid full-time officers.94 
As one police chief remarked: 
Oftentimes we have a part-timer, they get with other 
departments, and they work as many as three or four 
departments . . . . It just beats them up—it really does. 
You’ve got to be really careful that you don’t get the tail end 
of a double or a triple shift, because then you don’t have 
them at 100 percent.95 
Almost every county uses some part-time officers.96 But again, as 
Figure 3 illustrates, the national variation is significant. Figure 3 shows 
the percentage in each county of the overall law enforcement payroll that 
goes towards paying for part-time payroll.97 
  
 
 92. Other parts of this Article use full-time equivalents in their analyses. See supra Figure 
1. For example, elsewhere the Authors count two half-time officers as the equivalent of one full-
time officer for purposes of calculating “average” salaries (because otherwise comparisons 
between part-time and full-time salaries might be misleading). See infra Figures 5, 6 & 7. 
However, in this Section, the Authors want to shed light on the reliance of some departments on 
part-time officers. 
 93. Eli Hager, Policing is Not a Part-Time Job, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 22, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/22/policing-is-not-a-part-time-job [https://perma.cc 
/DU8W-253P]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bradbury, supra note 41.  
 96. See, e.g., Emily Balser, At Police Departments, Part-Time Officers Stretched Thin, 
AP NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/c8cedc50b39248d8ac5e23041d93d0c3 
[https://perma.cc/PZ6P-SYUW]. 
 97. Other measures could be used here, such as the percentage of part-time positions. 
However, because part-time positions vary tremendously (for example, from 10% positions to 
90% positions), the Authors thought the chosen measurement was the clearest, least misleading, 
and most broadly applicable. See infra Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 continues the theme of regional variation but of a different 
kind: there are clearly some parts of the country where part-time work is 
rare. In other parts of the country, part-time work is more common. 
However, the pattern in those parts of the country is spotty. For example, 
driving across the Great Plains one might continuously toggle between 
counties that significantly rely on part-time work and those that do not. 
Such a pattern suggests that decisions about relying on part-time work is 
driven by intensely local, rather than regional, factors.  
Figure 4 examines this question further. It departs from geography 
(where this Article illustrated one variable at a time) to show a 
relationship between the two variables of the previous two figures: the 
percentage of overall payroll used for part-time officers (vertical axis) 
and the average full-time equivalent annual salary (horizontal axis). Each 
dot represents one law enforcement agency. Dots are sized by the 
population that they serve. A blue smoothed conditional mean line 
illustrates the relationship between these variables.98  
  
 
 98. Please note, again, that this Article is not making causal claims here for many reasons, 
among them the absence of control variables.  
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Predictably, Figure 4 suggests that the agencies that have the lowest 
average salaries are also the ones that rely most heavily on part-time 
officers (the converse is suggestive as well: agencies that rely on part-
time officers tend to pay them the least). Part-time work in the world of 
law enforcement is, it seems, as lowly paid as in many other sectors of 
the economy.99  
Overall, it would likely be an oversimplification to say that the United 
States currently overinvests in police services. In many large and well-
resourced police departments, that might be true. But as the descriptive 
data presented above suggests, in many counties across the country the 
available tax dollars are so limited that communities can only afford to 
hire part-time police officers that receive wages far lower than their peers 
in nearby counties—and lower than many other industries.100 This 
matters for a couple of reasons.  
 
 99. Undoubtedly, many exceptions exist. The point here simply is to make visible broad 
national trends.  
 100. See supra Figure 4.  
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First, this is significant because there is evidence that police 
departments across the country are currently struggling to attract entry-
level applicants.101 The increasingly tight market for police officers 
means that communities unwilling to invest sufficient resources into 
officer salaries, benefits, and high-quality working conditions will likely 
lose out on the limited pool of available talent to other industries.102 In 
cities across the country, applications for open policing jobs have also 
declined. For example, job applications in Nashville declined from 4,700 
in 2010 to 1,900 in 2017.103 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
saw applications decline from 21,000 applicants per year to only 13,000 
in 2017.104 In total, nearly 66% of police departments recently surveyed 
by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) reported a decline in 
applicants.105 While some have argued that the increased scrutiny of 
police officers after Ferguson has contributed to a lack of interest in entry-
level policing jobs,106 others have argued that the strong economy in 
recent years has meant that police departments cannot compete with 
wages offered by the private industry.107 And police departments have 
had a particularly difficult time attracting minority officers.108 
Additionally, police departments have also struggled to retain officers in 
the profession.109 The PERF survey found that 29% of individuals who 
left their policing jobs voluntarily did so after being on the force for less 
than one year.110 Another 40% did so after being on the job for less than 
five years.111 
 
 101. Police Departments Struggle to Recruit Enough Officers, ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/01/05/police-departments-struggle-to-recruit-
enough-officers [https://perma.cc/V45L-WVDC]. 
 102. Tom Jackman, Who Wants to be a Police Officer? Job Applications Plummet at Most 
U.S. Departments, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
crime-law/2018/12/04/who-wants-be-police-officer-job-applications-plummet-most-us-departments 
[https://perma.cc/WY2N-FEJ6]. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Simone Weichselbaum & Wendi C. Thomas, Is the Answer to Crime More Cops?, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/02/ 
13/is-the-answer-to-crime-more-cops [https://perma.cc/V7BY-76X6] (“[I]t has become routine 
for national police leaders to complain that the politics of Black Lives Matter and viral videos of 
police killing civilians, along with low pay, have made it harder to recruit and retain qualified 
officers.”).  
 107. Jackman, supra note 102.  
 108. Id. (“Making departments more welcoming to minorities and women, in part by 
providing them with mentors and physical training, has enabled Tempe, Ariz., to maintain its 
recruitment numbers . . . .”). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
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Second, policing is an industry that exists within a market like any 
other. And like other industries, if one employer chooses to 
undercompensate its employees (in terms of salary, benefits, or working 
conditions), that employer will likely lose many of its employees to 
nearby competitors. In the world of policing, officers often have options 
to work at many different police agencies. As the data above indicates, 
there is widespread inequality in the resourcing of local police 
departments. Police departments only miles apart often pay drastically 
different wages and offer drastically different working conditions for 
their employees. And particularly at a time when departments are 
struggling to fill vacancies, police officers have a choice of where they 
want to work. A single metropolitan area typically has dozens or even 
hundreds of different law enforcement agencies. If one police department 
undercompensates its officers relative to its nearby agencies (as appears 
to be the case in many places in the United States today), it will likely 
struggle to retain the top talent—and instead it may be forced to accept 
officers that could not qualify for jobs at higher-paying agencies.   
This only scratches the surface of the consequences of inadequate and 
unequal funding of police departments. The next Part considers more 
thoroughly the implications of these descriptive findings for the delivery 
of policing services in the United States.  
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH INADEQUATE AND UNEQUAL FUNDING 
There are significant disparities in the funding of police departments 
across the country. Police budgets are almost always tied to local 
municipal budgets.112 And because communities tend to rely largely on 
local property and sales taxes to fund their police departments, vast 
differences in police funding is “not the exception” but instead the 
“rule.”113 As one study previous argued, “police departments across the 
country vary tremendously in size, operating budget, officer pay, training 
requirements, patrol methods, equipment, and on-the-ground 
strategies.”114   
Low funding and widespread inequality are not without consequence. 
This Part considers some of the possible consequences of underfunding 
local police departments. By underfunding local police departments (in 
absolute terms), communities may impair the ability of the police to 
control crime. They can frustrate efforts to adequately monitor and 
control officer misconduct. They may incentivize police departments to 
seek additional revenue through potentially harmful means like excessive 
ticketing or civil asset forfeitures. They encourage agencies to reduce 
 
 112. STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 37 
(2017). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 37–38 (footnotes omitted). 
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officer pay, which may ultimately increase the likelihood that police 
departments hire and retain unqualified or even dangerous applicants. 
And underfunding the public police may simply shift the delivery of 
public-safety services to the private industry.  
Additionally, the widespread police funding disparities that exist in 
the United States raise serious moral, policy, and distributional issues 
and, as this Article argues, fail to recognize policing as a fundamental 
public good. Combined, this suggests that defunding the police may 
ultimately exacerbate many of the problems that it seeks to fix.   
A.  Crime Rates 
First, there is an emerging body of research to suggest that police 
officers can influence crime rates. Thus, to the extent that underfunding 
of police departments contributes to fewer officers on the streets, 
communities that fail to provide adequate resources to their local police 
departments may inadvertently contribute to higher crime rates.115 For 
many decades, social scientists were skeptical that police could actually 
influence crime rates. For example, one literature review by Professor 
Samuel Cameron over thirty years ago found that eighteen of twenty-two 
prominent studies up to that point failed to find any evidence that police 
could reduce crime.116 However, many of these findings may have been 
because of the methodological limitations of cross-sectional studies that 
often suffered from endogeneity problems. That is, police departments 
were more likely to hire additional officers if their communities struggled 
with higher crime rates.117 Under these conditions, it often proved 
methodologically challenging to disentangle the effect of police-officer 
staffing on subsequent crime rates from the effects of other demographic 
and social variables that influence both crime and police-officer staffing 
rates.118 Even early quasi-experimental models failed to find any 
evidence that police could reduce crime in any statistically significant 
way. Perhaps most prominently, Professor George Kelling et al. varied 
the number of police officers assigned to fifteen different patrol beats in 
 
 115. Id. at 37. 
 116. Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 309 (1988).  
 117. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of 
Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 270–71 (1997) (“Higher crime rates are likely to 
increase the marginal productivity of police. Cities with high crime rates, therefore, may tend to 
have larger police forces, even if police reduce crime. Detroit has twice as many police officers 
per capita as Omaha, and a violent crime rate over four times as high, but it would be a mistake 
to attribute the differences in crime rates to the presence of the police.”).  
 118. Id. at 271. 
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Kansas City, Missouri.119 To the surprise of many policing experts,120 
Kelling et al. found that the number of officers assigned to a beat patrol 
did not affect crime rates in any statistically significant way.121  
In recent decades, though, an emerging and growing body of literature 
has found that police officers—particularly officers empowered with 
effective policing strategies—can likely have a statistically significant 
effect on crime rates. First, a handful of studies have found that police 
staffing rates likely have an impact on overall crime rates, particularly 
violent crime rates. For example, in 1997 Professor Steven Levitt used 
the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as a proxy for police 
staffing to argue that police staffing causally affects crime rates.122 While 
some scholars have taken issue with Levitt’s methodology,123 subsequent 
studies have generally found that increases in police staffing likely do 
decrease crime rates.124 Second, a robust body of research suggests that 
specific policing strategies designed to disrupt situational incentives of 
 
 119. GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A 
SUMMARY REPORT 2 (1974).  
 120. See, e.g., GREGORY F. TREVERTON ET AL., MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE OF POLICING 
23 (2011). 
 121. KELLING ET AL., supra note 119.   
 122. Levitt, supra note 117, at 279.  
 123. Justin McCrary, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police 
on Crime: Comment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1236, 1236–37 (2002) (calling into question some of 
Levitt’s 1997 findings).  
 124. For example, Professors Aaron Chaflin and Justin McCrary used error-corrected 
estimates of police elasticity to argue that police can influence crime rates and to claim that the 
United States currently employs a suboptimal number of police officers. Aaron Chalfin & Justin 
McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 167 
(2018). Chalfin and McCrary also provide a detailed literature review on this topic, concluding: 
 
A large literature has used city- or state-level panel data and, recently, a 
variety of quasi-experimental designs to estimate the elasticity of crime with 
respect to manpower. . . .  
The early panel-data literature tended to report small elasticity estimates 
that were rarely distinguishable from zero and sometimes even positive, 
suggesting perversely that police increase crime. . . . 
. . . . 
[But] Levitt (1997) has given rise to a series of related papers that seek to 
identify a national effect of police manpower on crime by isolating 
conditionally exogenous within-city variation in police staffing 
levels. . . . These strategies consistently demonstrate that police do reduce 
crime. . . . [T]he pattern of the cross-crime elasticities [is characterized] 
as . . . favoring a larger effect of police on violent crimes than on property 
crimes, with especially large effects of police on murder, robbery, and motor 
vehicle theft. 
 
Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 5, 13–14 (2017) (footnotes omitted).  
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would-be criminals can actually reduce, rather than merely displace, 
crime. For example, one meta-analysis conducted by Professor Anthony 
Braga et al. in 2014 found that hot-spot policing strategies likely produce 
small but statistically significant reductions in certain crime rates, while 
the use of problem-oriented policing strategies contributes to even larger 
decreases in crime.125 And third, some studies have found that regulation 
of police may inadvertently impair their ability to use crime-fighting 
strategies, thereby increasing crime.126  
Overall, the existing literature suggests that both police staffing and 
police strategies can influence crime rates. To the extent that 
underfunding or defunding police departments reduces officer staffing 
rates or prevents departments from effectively employing crime-fighting 
strategies, this lack of funding may lead to more crime. And increased 
crime rates generally do not affect all neighborhoods equally. Residents 
of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, which are often 
disproportionately black and Latinx, frequently bear the brunt of crime. 
For example, as Professor Franklin Zimring has previously observed, 
when New York City experienced its highest crime rates in the early 
1990s, black and Latinx neighborhoods experienced the brunt of this 
crime epidemic.127 Conversely, when crime dropped dramatically 
through 1990s and early 2000s, victimization among the black and Latinx 
communities dropped more significantly than victimization among other 
racial groups.128  
To be clear, policing is not just about crime control. As countless 
scholars have previously written, misconduct by police officers 
 
 125. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634–35 (2014). 
 126. See, e.g., RICHARD ROSENFELD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WAS THERE A “FERGUSON 
EFFECT” ON CRIME IN ST. LOUIS? 1–3 (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/09/Ferguson-Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LFL-MV6Q]; Paul G. Cassell & Richard 
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law 
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1998) (linking Miranda to a decrease in police 
clearance rates); David C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large 
U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2016) (“[D]isaggregated analyses revealed that robbery rates, 
declining before Ferguson, increased in the months after Ferguson.”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin 
Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 768 (2017) (finding that efforts by the DOJ to 
regulate police departments may inadvertently contribute to a temporary uptick in certain crime 
rates, as police officers adjust to new oversight, training, and disciplinary norms); Lan Shi, The 
Limit of Oversight in Policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincinnati Riot, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 111 
(2009) (finding that arrests fell substantially in the wake of the Cincinnati riots, with the largest 
effect apparent for crimes where police had significant discretion).  
 127. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR 
URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 34 (2012).  
 128. Id. at 42.  
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disproportionately affects communities of color,129 eroding public trust 
and contributing to civilian injuries, deaths, and serious dignitary harms. 
Nevertheless, any discussion of policing and police funding must 
confront the growing body of literature on the relationship between 
policing and crime control. Reducing the number of police officers on the 
streets may create fewer opportunities for officers to engage in 
professional misconduct that disproportionately affects racial minorities. 
After all, without officers on the street, there will not be any officers to 
commit acts of misconduct. But by taking such a step, communities must 
be prepared to accept the risk of increased crime disproportionately 
affecting racial minorities.  
B.  Police Violence, Officer Misconduct, and Officer Injuries 
Underfunded police departments may also be at a heightened risk of 
engaging in professional misconduct, including the use of unjustified 
force against civilians. Because of this heightened risk of violent 
encounters with civilians, underfunded officers may face higher risks to 
their own personal safety.  
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the relationship between funding and 
officer misconduct than the series of investigative reports issued by the 
DOJ pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. This statute gives 
the DOJ the power to investigate and seek equitable relief against police 
departments engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional 
misconduct.130 While the enforcement of this statute has varied over 
time,131 the DOJ has used this measure to investigate over sixty police 
departments across the country since the statute’s passage in 1994.132 One 
analysis conducted by Sarah Childress of PBS Frontline found that the 
 
 129. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon et al., The Influence of Race in Police-Civilian Interactions: 
A Content Analysis of Videotaped Interactions Taken During Cincinnati Police Traffic Stops, 58 
J. COMM. 530, 544 (2008). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority . . . 
to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”); id. § 14141(b) 
(“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that [there is a pattern or 
practice of misconduct], the Attorney General . . . may in a civil action obtain appropriate 
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”). 
 131. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 
3228–35 (2014) (showing how enforcement of § 14141 has varied by presidential administration).  
 132. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 126, at 777–78 (showing a full list of DOJ investigations 
and negotiated settlements pursuant to § 14141); see also Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police 
Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 793, 794 (2016) (describing how during the Obama Administration alone the DOJ 
opened thirty-six investigations and reached approximately twenty-one agreements under § 
14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 1343, 1367–72 (2015) (providing additional context about how the DOJ selects cases for 
§ 14141 inquiries and the process that follows).  
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DOJ observed allegations of officers regularly using excessive force in 
70% of these cases; discriminatory policing in 55% of these cases; and 
unlawful searches or seizures in 42% of these cases.133 In response to 
these findings, the DOJ has commonly recommended that agencies 
improve training, implement computerized risk-assessment systems to 
identify officers engaged in patterns of misconduct, reform internal 
investigation and disciplinary procedures, and implement a wide range of 
other policy and procedure changes.134 Virtually all of these reforms have 
one thing in common: they cost a substantial amount of money to 
implement. Previous estimates have placed the cost of federal consent 
decrees in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on 
the size of the police department and the complexity of the agreement.135  
Take Cleveland, Ohio, as an example. The DOJ opened an 
investigation into the Cleveland Police Department after allegations of 
excessive force and discriminatory policing that surfaced between 2011 
and 2013.136 The public outcry began after a series of articles in the 
Cleveland Plain Dealer suggested that a relatively small group of officers 
were involved in a disproportionate number of the alleged excessive force 
cases yet were not adequately disciplined.137 Public calls for reform 
intensified in 2012 after thirteen police officers fired 137 shots at two 
unarmed black individuals in a middle-school parking lot.138 Then, during 
 
 133. Sarah Childress, Fixing the Force, PBS: FRONTLINE (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/fixing-the-force/ [https://perma.cc/S9LY-3FLL] 
(calculating these percentages using the numbers provided in the interactive figure, which was 
last visited in November of 2019).  
 134. See Rushin, supra note 132, at 1378–87 (describing common elements of negotiated 
settlements between the DOJ and local police departments).  
 135. See id. at 1393 (using Los Angeles as an example of a city where the total price tag of 
implementing a federal consent decree likely “surpassed $100 million” because of the cost of 
external monitoring, capital investments, staff, training, and more).  
 136. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 7–9 
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/ 
cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CKM-53GF] (describing 
the background that led to the investigation of the Cleveland Police Department and explicitly 
mentioning “serious allegations that CDP officers use excessive force, and that the Division fails 
to identify, correct, and hold officers accountable for using force in violation of the Constitution”).  
 137. See, e.g., Henry J. Gomez & Gabriel Baird, 6 Cleveland Officers Accused of Brutality 
Have Used Force on 39 Suspects Since 2009, CLEVELAND.COM (May 22, 2011), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/05/cleveland_police_officers_accu.html [https://perma.cc/ 
RUT8-LTUC]; Henry J. Gomez & Gabriel Baird, 2 Cleveland Police Officers Charged with 
Assault are Among Department’s Most Prolific Users of Force, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 27, 2011), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/03/cleveland_police_officers_kevi.html 
[https://perma.cc/C48W-NPGG]. 
 138. See Kimbriell Kelly & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Officer Acquitted in Killing of 
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the process of this DOJ investigation, Cleveland police officer Timothy 
Loehmann shot and killed a twelve-year-old boy named Tamir Rice while 
he played with a toy gun in a public park.139 Subsequent investigations 
into the incident found that Loehmann had previously been deemed 
emotionally unstable and unfit for duty when he worked on the police 
force of the nearby Cleveland suburb of Independence, Ohio.140 While 
the incident resulted in no criminal charges, the city ultimately agreed to 
pay Rice’s family a settlement of $6 million.141  
Only weeks after the Rice shooting, the DOJ issued its finding letter, 
concluding that the Cleveland police were engaged in patterns of 
excessive and unnecessary use of deadly force.142 It found that officers 
also used tasers and pepper spray unnecessarily or even in retaliation.143 
And it found that officers frequently used excessive force against 
individuals suffering from mental illness.144 In May 2015, the DOJ 
entered into a consent decree with the City of Cleveland to fix these 
patterns of violations.145 The agreement required the appointment of an 
 
people/2015/05/23/280844f0-f028-11e4-a55f-38924fca94f9_story.html [https://perma.cc/CDZ6-
VVCE] (providing a detailed breakdown of the events leading to the officer’s trial and the ultimate 
verdict).  
 139. See Jane Morice, Appeal Filed on Behalf of Cleveland Police Union to Overturn Firing 
of Timothy Loehmann, Ex-Cleveland Cop Who Fatally Shot Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND.COM 
(Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/crime/2019/03/appeal-filed-on-behalf-of-cleveland-
police-union-to-overturn-firing-of-timothy-loehmann-ex-cleveland-cop-who-fatally-shot-tamir-
rice.html [https://perma.cc/2S95-2JES] (“Loehmann shot 12-year-old Tamir less than three 
seconds after arriving at the Cudell Recreation Center in November 2014.”).  
 140. Adam Ferrise, Cleveland Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Had ‘Dismal’ Handgun 
Performance for Independence Police, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.cleveland 
.com/metro/2014/12/cleveland_police_officer_who_s.html [https://perma.cc/7SHT-SV5Y]; see 
also  Christine Mai-Duc, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Had Been Deemed Unfit for 
Duty, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
cleveland-tamir-rice-timothy-loehmann-20141203-story.html [https://perma.cc/55KD-9YPF] 
(“Supervisors described [Loehmann as] an emotionally unstable recruit with a ‘lack of maturity’ 
and ‘inability to perform basic functions as instructed’ during a weapons training exercise.”). Yet, 
even after leaving the Cleveland Police Department, Loehmann was briefly hired by another 
agency in Ohio. Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Hired by Rural Police Force, CBS NEWS (Oct. 6, 
2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timothy-loehmann-police-officer-who-killed-
tamir-rice-hired-bellaire-ohio [https://perma.cc/N95K-J8EW]. 
 141. Lauren Hodges, Cleveland to Pay $6 Million to Settle Tamir Rice Lawsuit, NPR 
(Apr. 25, 2016, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/25/475583746/ 
cleveland-to-pay-6-million-to-settle-tamir-rice-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/AZ5L-ZRMH].  
 142. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 1–4.  
 143. Id. at 3 (including in the list of ways that Cleveland police were engaged in a pattern of 
unconstitutional misconduct: “[t]he unnecessary, excessive or retaliatory use of less lethal force 
including tasers, chemical spray and fists”).  
 144. Id. 
 145. See Joint Motion and Memorandum for Entry of Consent Decree at 1, United States v. 
City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046 (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015); Settlement Agreement at 2–3, 
City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046. 
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external monitor, paid by Cleveland taxpayers, to oversee the police 
department.146 It required new training protocols for officers.147 It 
mandated additional paperwork and regulations of the civil complaint 
process.148 It required the hiring of new staff to collect and analyze data 
on officer behavior.149 It required the hiring of a new police inspector 
general to oversee the protection of civil rights by the police 
department.150 It required the hiring of a crisis-intervention coordinator151 
and a training coordinator.152 And it required upgrades to computer 
technology to better track officer behavior over time.153 In the DOJ’s 
opinion, these kinds of investments were necessary to correct the pattern 
of unconstitutional misconduct present in the agency. But these reforms 
would not come cheap. As Rich Exner from the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
concluded, these regulations could likely cost Cleveland taxpayers up to 
$55 million over a five-year period.154 
While costly, emerging empirical evidence suggests that these 
reforms likely contribute to measurable decreases in rates of officer 
misconduct. For example, a careful study by Professors Zachary A. 
Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl, and John L. Worrall found that federal 
consent decrees were “associated with modest reductions in the risk of 
[federal] civil rights” lawsuits for officer misconduct.155 Other empirical 
examinations of § 14141 consent decrees have found that they contribute 
to reductions in officer use of force,156 increases in civilian satisfaction 
 
 146. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 145, at 80–92 (outlining the selection and 
appointment of an external monitor and their responsibilities). 
 147. See id. at 19–20, 35–36, 63–67 (describing various types of training required for officers 
going forward).  
 148. See id. at 43–54 (describing how the Cleveland police should document and handle 
civilian complaints).  
 149. Id. at 93 (requiring the hiring of new personnel as necessary for the implementation of 
the agreement).  
 150. Id. at 58. 
 151. Id. at 35.  
 152. Id. at 65.  
 153. See id. at 76–77 (explaining how the Cleveland police must develop an officer-
intervention program that includes a computerized relational database to collect and review data 
on officer behavior, including uses of force, taser discharges, injuries or deaths to persons in 
custody, civilian complaints, failures to initiate recordings via body cameras, negative credibility 
assessments, disciplinary action, corrective action, and more).  
 154. Rich Exner, How Much Cleveland Will Pay to Reform Its Police Department Under 
Consent Decree, CLEVELAND.COM (June 2, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/ 
2015/06/how_much_it_will_cost_clevelan.html. [https://perma.cc/PR6F-UXXM]. 
 155. Zachary A. Powell et al., Police Consent Decrees and Section 1983 Civil Rights 
Litigation, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 575, 577 (2017). 
 156. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in 
American Police Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 125–26 (2016) (showing that, as an 
example, Los Angeles appeared to see somewhat of a decrease in certain types of use of force 
during its consent decree).   
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with law enforcement,157 and improved processing of civilian 
complaints.158 The lesson from § 14141 cases is clear. For many of the 
most troubled police departments, the problem comes down to a lack of 
financial investment in oversight and accountability mechanisms. 
Without investment in proper training, early-intervention systems, and 
staff dedicated to accountability, policing organizations can develop 
cultures that permit or even promote professional misconduct. These 
investments are not cheap. And by defunding or underfunding police 
departments in response to patterns of police misconduct, activists risk 
exacerbating the very problem that they seek to remedy.  
Defunding or a lack of adequate resources may also contribute to 
police misconduct in another, less obvious way. The majority of police 
officers are part of police unions that negotiate collectively with their 
employers about wages, benefits, and other conditions or terms of 
employment.159 This generally includes internal disciplinary procedures, 
including how supervisors can investigate, suspend, or fire officers 
suspected of engaging in professional misconduct.160 Evidence compiled 
by Campaign Zero has shown that police union contracts often contain a 
range of potentially problematic clauses that can impede legitimate 
internal investigations into officer misconduct.161 These police contracts 
commonly delay interrogations of officers suspected of misconduct, 
require that officers get access to information before any such 
 
 157. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S 
EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 35, 38 (2002), https://www.vera.org/downloads/ 
Publications/turning-necessities-into-virtue-pittsburghs-experience-with-a-federal-consent-
decree/legacy_downloads/Pittsburgh_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FTC-5FSE] (showing 
that a clear majority of respondents thought a consent decree was necessary and that the 
department had either stayed the same or improved because of it); CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., 
POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 44, 
68 (2009), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/GPX9-DJFJ] (showing a general increase in civilian satisfaction with local law enforcement in 
Los Angeles after the initiation of a federal consent decree); GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., POLICE-
COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI 89–107 (2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG853.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B7J-3588] (showing an 
increase in the community’s perception of police professionalism in Cincinnati). 
 158. Cf. Rushin, supra note 156, at 116–17, 117 n.30 (noting that the Los Angeles Police 
Department was required to improve citizen complaint procedures under § 14141 and describing 
the use of sting audits to ensure compliance with complaint procedures).  
 159. See BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (2010), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC93-NMVQ] (explaining that 
roughly two-thirds of police officers are part of departments that authorize collective bargaining).  
 160. Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 558–61 (2019) 
(describing how collective bargaining contributes to internal disciplinary procedures).  
 161. DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS 
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interrogation, purge disciplinary files, mandate the use of arbitration on 
appeal, block the consideration of anonymous civilian complaints, and 
more.162 Reporting from a number of different cities has found that 
jurisdictions are often forced into offering these expansive protections 
from disciplinary investigations and punishment, in part because they 
cannot afford to meet officer demands for higher salaries and better 
benefits.163 And as communities have explored pulling back some of 
these protections, they have faced a harsh reality: if they try to do so, 
police officer unions will demand higher compensation and better 
benefits as a trade-off during negotiations.164  
Thus, underfunding or defunding can contribute to police misconduct 
by forcing police departments to make up for their inability to offer 
competitive wages and benefits by insulating officers from disciplinary 
oversight and accountability. This trade-off may temporarily placate 
officers and avoid personnel loss, but it comes at a high price. Emerging 
empirical evidence suggests that by offering these disciplinary 
concessions, police departments may increase the likelihood of violence 
against civilians and professional misconduct by officers.165  
Anecdotes, like those described above, lead the Authors to 
hypothesize about the possible relationship between the two variables—
that is, when police departments fail to properly fund police departments, 
the Authors believe it is possible that those officers may engage in more 
violent encounters with civilians because of a lack of proper training, 
support, equipment, and hiring controls. Clearly, more rigorous empirical 
examination is needed. To preliminarily explore the hypothesis that 
underfunding may contribute to more officer misconduct and violent 
encounters with civilians, the Authors combined the data from Figures 1 
through 4 with two additional datasets. First, this Article relies on the 
Washington Post “Fatal Force” database of police officer shootings since 
 
 162. See id. at 2; see also Abdul Rad, Police Institutions and Abuse: Evidence from the US 
41–52 (Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3246419 (categorizing union contracts according to many different variables).  
 163. John Chase & David Heinzmann, Cops Traded Away Pay for Protection in Police 
Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
chicago-police-contracts-fop- 20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/D5SE-93J9]. 
 164. See Tonya Francisco, Police Union Contract Talks Continue, as Do Calls from More 
Civilian Oversight, WGN9 (May 21, 2019, 6:12 PM), https://wgntv.com/2018/05/21/police-
union-contract-talks-continue-as-do-calls-from-more-civilian-oversight (stating that local 
residents in Chicago have applied pressure to the city to rethink some of the protections given to 
Chicago officers in their contracts) [https://perma.cc/5N7F-MY24]; see also Mark Wilson, Austin 
Police Union Ready to Re-Enter Contract Negotiations, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 30, 2018, 
12:01 AM), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/ 20180130/Austin-police-union-ready-to-re-
enter-contract-negotiations [https://perma.cc/BCV9-84A9] (describing how demands by local 
residents have forced a reconsideration of portions of the local police contract).  
 165. Rad, supra note 162, at 41–52. 
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2015.166 This is one of several important new attempts by the media, 
activists, and social scientists to document how often police officers kill 
civilians. Other similar databases include “The Counted” database by the 
Guardian,167 Mapping Police Violence organized by Campaign Zero,168 
Fatal Encounters,169 and Killed by Police.170 The Washington Post 
database aims to catalogue every fatal shooting nationwide by a police 
officer in the line of duty because data compiled by the federal 
government was unreliable and incomplete.171 The Authors chose to rely 
on this database because the project won the 2016 Pulitzer Prize for 
National Reporting, suggesting a high level of reliability.172 The raw data 
is available online.173  
The data, while better than anything else available or that could have 
been assembled by the Authors, has a significant limitation. This Article 
is particularly interested in the geographic location of a fatal-force 
incident and the particular law enforcement agency involved. However, 
the Washington Post database typically relies on local newspaper reports 
to identify locations.174 Such reporting frequently uses colloquial names, 
names of specific neighborhoods within larger cities, small and 
unincorporated towns and townships, misspelled entries, and reports that 
confuse tribal names with cities and counties. This Article supplements 
the Washington Post database with the Authors’ research to disambiguate 
such entries. Additionally, the Washington Post database identifies 
locations of incidents but does not always identify law enforcement 
agencies involved in the incidents. For example, it does not identify 
whether the officer involved in a fatal shooting was a county sheriff 
 
 166. See Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019 [https://perma.cc/8SNX-G8VJ] (providing a 
continuously updated tally of killings by police officers in the United States).  
 167. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, https://www.the 
guardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database 
[https://perma.cc/BP8B-ZRYS]. 
 168. Samuel Sinyangwe, Mapping Police Violence, MAPPINGPOLICEVIOLENCE.ORG, 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org [https://perma.cc/XG2S-T5DW] (last updated May 15, 2019). 
 169. D. Brian Burghart, Fatal Encounters, FATAL ENCOUNTERS (June 28, 2019), 
https://fatalencounters.org [https://perma.cc/AVP2-7LL5]. 
 170. Police Shooting Database, KILLED BY POLICE, https://killedbypolice.net 
[https://perma.cc/6BTG-T4RQ].  
 171. Tate et al., supra note 166.  
 172. The 2016 Pulitzer Prize Winner in National Reporting, PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/washington-post-staff [https://perma.cc/5QHC-72AS]. 
 173. Raw data can be found at Fatal Police Shootings Data, https://raw.githubuser 
content.com/washingtonpost/data-police-shootings/master/fatal-police-shootings-data.csv 
[https://perma.cc/AT6E-4MFB]. Nevertheless, the database must be treated with caution because 
it relies on newspaper reports of fatal incidents (that might in turn be faulty or incomplete) and 
tips from newspaper readers. About This Story, GITHUB, https://github.com/washingtonpost/data-
police-shootings [https://perma.cc/S3N9-DLXW]. 
 174. About This Story, supra note 173. 
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deputy or a town police officer. As such, all figures in this Article that 
rely on the Washington Post database use counties as units of analysis.175   
In Figure 5, this Article uses the Washington Post data described in 
Part I to graphically illustrate the relationship between the number of 
deaths caused by police per 100,000 residents compared to the average 
pay for police officers in each county in the United States. For clarity 
purposes, it removes extreme outliers and counties where no deaths were 
reported. While the blue line represents an approximate trend line 
illustrating the general correlation between these two variables, it is 
important to emphasize that this graph does not demonstrate a causal 
relationship, and police violence against civilians is obviously a crude 
measure of officer misconduct or police violence more generally.176 Even 
so, Figure 5 provides some initially useful evidence that future social 
scientists may want to use to investigate the relationship between police 
violence and police funding.  
 
 
 175. Having collected and cleaned these four sources of data, the Authors combined them. 
ASG, ASPEP, and Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted data was easily matched by 
Census FIPS codes. See American National Standards Institute/Federal Information Processing 
Standards (ANSI/FIPS), CENSUS.GOV, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/fips 
[https://perma.cc/UN67-XBCF] (providing the definitions for the American National Standards 
Institute codes). The Washington Post data only uses names of locations and had to be matched 
by script.  
 176. To elaborate further, the variables that the Authors are most interested in measuring are 
difficult and perhaps impossible to obtain. For example, it would be invaluable to have a reliable 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction longitudinal count of how many routine traffic stops descended into 
verbal altercations or violence. But instead the Authors have only the crudest count of when 
interactions resulted in the death of an officer or civilian. The Authors recognize that such 
instances only represent the most dramatic tip of a much larger iceberg with an unknown shape. 
It is unclear whether that iceberg is small or big, deep or broad, skewed or even. The Authors 
suspect (again, without knowing or having a way to know) that in many cases the instances of 
death are a good proxy for dangerous behavior that also takes many other forms. But the Authors 
also recognize that such instances of death might be totally unrepresentative of what goes on in a 
given community. As such, the Authors caution readers and future researchers to be aware of 
where the data is crude and where it is not. 
33
Rushin and Michalski: Police Funding
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
310 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time 
Equivalent) and Police Killings of Civilians per 100,000 Residents 
Next, this Article analyzes an additional data source to determine 
whether underfunding of police may be related to the risk of physical 
violence against officers in the line of duty: the FBI’s database on Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA).177 It reports 
“information concerning line-of-duty deaths and/or assaults of law 
enforcement officers in the United States.”178 The data distinguishes 
between accidental and felonious deaths and assaults that resulted in 
injuries and those that did not.179 The data is collected from FBI field 
offices and “[c]ity, college and university, county, state, tribal, and 
 
 177. 2018 Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, FBI: UCR (2018), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2018 [https://perma.cc/5BRM-DF7X]. 
 178. Id. Typically, it has used summary statistics tables of the data that are readily available 
online. For the raw data, researchers must either contact the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division or utilize another data archive. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program Data: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, United States, 2016, NACJD 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/37062 [https://perma.cc 
/YC39-VNED]. 
 179. 2018 Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, supra note 177. 
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federal law enforcement agencies participating in the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program.”180 LEOKA has been used widely by courts181 and 
academics.182 LEOKA provides an invaluable tool to measure and 
geographically pinpoint violence directed at officers.183 However, the 
LEOKA data only focuses on assaults and deaths of law enforcement 
officers in the line of duty. It makes no attempts to collect related 
information for civilians.184 
This Article uses the LEOKA data to visually illustrate the 
relationship between fatalities of officers in the line of duty in Figure 6. 
Again, this Article uses trend lines to illustrate the relationship between 
the two variables, which should be understood as illustrating a general 
trend and not demonstrating any apparent causation between these two 
variables absent more rigorous empirical analysis. This Article also 
removes jurisdictions that reported no deaths and jurisdictions that appear 
to be extreme outliers. This kind of preliminary analysis suggests that 
there may be some type of relationship worthy of further, rigorous 
empirical exploration.  
  
 
 180. Methodology: Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2018/resource-pages/methodology-officers-accidentally-killed.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VK89-JZG5]. 
 181. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24, 24 n.21 (1968) (citing FBI statistics to make 
the point that “American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this 
country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are 
wounded”). See generally Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic 
Stops, 117 MICH. L. REV. 635, 647 n.55 (2019) (citing cases and remarking that “[s]everal courts 
have also referenced or relied on LEOKA statistics in their opinions when discussing the safety 
risks that routine traffic stops pose to law enforcement officers”). 
 182. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Police, Race, and the Production of Capital 
Homicides, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 261, 291 n.125 (2018); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, 
From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 263, 302 n.245 (2017); David B. Mustard, The Impact of Gun Laws on Police Deaths, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 635, 640, 640 n.25 (2001). 
 183. The strength of this data is that it originates from close to the source by parties motivated 
to report fully. The weakness of this data mirrors the strength: reporting law enforcement agencies 
might have skewed views of what to report and might (intentionally or not) overreport to secure 
public support or underreport to mask misbehavior. 
 184. See  Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 126 
(2016) (“It seems incongruent for the federal government to keep detailed records on the number 
of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted in the line of duty, but not keep comparable records 
on citizens killed or assaulted by law enforcement.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time 






























However, when comparing the number of police injuries that do not 
result in fatalities to police funding, the relationship appears to be less 
suggestive. Figure 7 plots police injuries against police compensation, 
using the same methodology described above.  
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Figure 7: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time 
Equivalent) and Police Assaults (with and without injuries) in the 





























Overall, the Authors believe that this kind of preliminary analysis, 
combined with the anecdotal evidence presented above, makes a strong 
case that underfunding of police departments may heighten the risk of 
officer misconduct and police violence—but substantially more empirical 
research is necessary on this topic to verify these hypotheses.   
C.  Dangerous Revenue Streams 
Underfunding may also increase pressure on law enforcement 
agencies to find alternative revenue streams. In this way, underfunding 
or defunding police may not actually reduce policing activity but, instead, 
simply shift police enforcement to revenue generating law enforcement 
actions that raise serious constitutional and public policy concerns. The 
DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) is a 
37
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cautionary tale. The DOJ initiated its investigation of the FPD in response 
to the public protests of the shooting of Michael Brown in 2014.185 The 
DOJ ultimately released a detailed and scathing report in March of 2015 
concluding that the FPD was engaged in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional misconduct in violation of the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.186 While the DOJ ultimately 
failed to find evidence that Officer Darren Wilson violated federal law 
when he shot Brown, it did uncover significant evidence that when they 
faced significant funding issues, FPD leadership and city leaders used the 
police department as a source to generate revenue in a manner that 
routinely violated residents’ civil rights—particularly black residents.187  
For example, the DOJ discovered that back in 2010, the finance 
director in Ferguson emailed the police chief to tell him that “[w]e are 
looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall” unless “ticket writing ramps 
up significantly before the end of the year.”188 In response to the pressure 
created by a lack of revenue, the police chief changed officers to a twelve-
hour shift schedule designed to “increase traffic enforcement per shift.”189 
Thereafter, the Ferguson police engaged in “aggressive code 
enforcement” that seemed to be largely unrelated to public safety and 
often based on questionable understandings of the law.190 Officers would 
commonly issue multiple citations for the same violation.191 They would 
sometimes issue “six, eight, or, in at least one instance, fourteen citations 
for a single encounter.”192 Some officers told the DOJ investigators that 
they would compete to see who could issue the most citations in a single 
civilian encounter.193 Supervisors posted lists showing the number of 
citations issued by each officer, in hopes of motivating officers to write 
 
 185. Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on 
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/ 
justice-department-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html [https://perma.cc/WVC3-D466] (“The 
shooting was deemed justified, but it galvanized protesters, helped start the Black Lives Matter 
movement and brought the attention of the Department of Justice to the city’s police practices.”).  
 186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, at i 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KN5-LGE7]. 
 187. See id. at 2. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 10 (“Law enforcement experience has shown that this schedule makes community 
policing more difficult—a concern that we have also heard directly from FPD officers. 
Nonetheless, while FPD heavily considered the revenue implications of the 12-hour shift and 
certain other factors such as its impact on overtime and sick time usage, we have found no 
evidence that FPD considered the consequences for positive community engagement.”).  
 190. Id. at 11.  
 191. Id.   
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
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even more tickets.194 And supervisors used “productivity,” as measured 
in part by the number of citations, in making disciplinary and promotion 
decisions.195  
This use of municipal traffic and code violations to generate revenue 
had devastating impacts on many members of the community. As the 
report highlighted:  
One woman . . . received two parking tickets for a single 
violation in 2007 that then totaled $151 plus fees. Over seven 
years later, she still owed Ferguson $541—after already 
paying $550 in fines and fees, having multiple arrest 
warrants issued against her, and being arrested and jailed on 
several occasions. . . . A 90-year-old man had a warrant 
issued for his arrest after he failed to timely pay the five 
citations FPD issued to him during a single traffic stop in 
2013. An 83-year-old man had a warrant issued against him 
when he failed to timely resolve his Derelict Auto violation. 
A 67-year-old woman told us she was stopped and arrested 
by a Ferguson police officer for an outstanding warrant for 
failure to pay a trash-removal citation. She did not know 
about the warrant until her arrest, and the court ultimately 
charged her $1,000 in fines, which she continues to pay off 
in $100 monthly increments despite being on a limited, fixed 
income. We have heard similar stories from dozens of other 
individuals and have reviewed court records documenting 
many additional instances of similarly harsh penalties, often 
for relatively minor violations.196    
In the years leading up to the DOJ investigation, these tactics helped 
the Ferguson police to overcome budget shortfalls. But in the process, the 
police department eroded public trust and seriously disrupted the lives of 
hundreds of individuals. Poor black residents in Ferguson also 
disproportionately experienced the harm of these revenue-generating 
policing tactics. Between 2012 and 2014, black individuals accounted for 
90% of the citations issued by the police, despite representing only 67% 
of Ferguson’s population.197 And black individuals were far more likely 
to be subject to multiple citations in a single encounter. The DOJ 
documented seventy-three times when Ferguson police issued four or 
 
 194. Id. (“Each month, the municipal court provides FPD supervisors with a list of the 
number of tickets issued by each officer and each squad. Supervisors have posted the list inside 
the police station, a tactic officers say is meant to push them to write more citations.”). 
 195. Id. at 11–12. As an example, the report describes how “[i]n April 2010 . . . a patrol 
supervisor criticized a sergeant for his squad only issuing 25 tickets in a month, including one 
officer who issued ‘a grand total’ of 11 tickets to six people on three days ‘devoted to traffic 
stops.’” Id. at 11. 
 196. Id. at 42.  
 197. Id. at 4. 
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more citations to a black individual in a single incident, but only two 
times when a similarly large number of citations were ever issued to a 
non-black individual.198 Black individuals were also substantially more 
likely to be subject to tickets for highly discretionary offenses and were 
more likely to have arrest warrants issued for failure to pay municipal 
fines.199 
This phenomenon is almost certainly not limited to Ferguson. An 
example from New York further illustrates how revenue-generating 
policing can lead to officers targeting minority groups. There, a new local 
investigation found that numerous officers felt pressured to increase 
summons and arrests to illustrate their productivity to supervisors.200 As 
one officer candidly explained to the reporter,  
[W]hen you go hunting, when you put any type of numbers 
on a police officer to perform, we are going to go for the 
most vulnerable. Of course, we’re going to go for the LGBT 
community, we’re going to the black community, we’re 
going to those that have no vote, that have no power.201  
Unfortunately, there appears to be no immediately obvious way to test 
empirically whether there is a definitive relationship between these two 
variables, in part because of the lack of uniform national data on this type 
of low-level ticketing and enforcement. Future studies may be able to 
examine this question by taking advantage of quasi-experimental 
settings, such as where individual jurisdictions or clusters of jurisdictions 
experience sudden disinvestment creating unexpected budgetary 
constraints on a police department. 
D.  Disciplinary Shifting  
Additionally, a growing body of evidence suggests that inadequate 
resources may force underfunded police departments to lower their 
standards for employment. This can lead to a phenomenon the Authors 
describe as disciplinary shifting—a process by which poorer police 
departments that cannot compete with the salaries of other departments 
may be forced to hire officers that may be otherwise unemployable by 
other departments because of prior misconduct. Some empirical evidence 
for this proposition comes from a recent study conducted by Professors 
 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 5.  
 200. Sarah Wallace, I-Team: More NYPD Officers Say There’s Proof of Quota-Driven 
Arrests, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:17 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/ 
NYPD-Officers-Arrest-Quota-Exclusive-Interview-Pressure-Numbers-374077091.html [https:// 
perma.cc/64AJ-3K9B].  
 201. Id.  
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Ben Grunwald and John Rappaport.202 They evaluated a dataset of around 
77,000 full-time police officers employed by the roughly 500 law 
enforcement agencies in Florida.203 They found that, in any given year, 
around 4% of all police officers in the state were previously fired from 
another agency.204 While these officers appeared to have some trouble 
finding employment at another agency, Professors Grunwald and 
Rappaport found that these so-called wandering officers sometimes find 
future employment at smaller agencies with fewer resources, and in 
municipalities with larger communities of color.205 And these wandering 
officers pose more serious risks of future misconduct compared to their 
peers. An officer who was previously fired by another agency in Florida 
is roughly twice as likely to be fired from his next employer for 
misconduct than other similarly situated officers.206 Thus, to the extent 
that underfunding or defunding a police department reduces the ability of 
that department to compete with nearby agencies in compensation or 
benefits, this process may ultimately contribute to the agency hiring more 
unqualified or wandering officers with histories of professional 
misconduct that are likelier to recommit similar offenses.  
An example from the Chicago suburb of Dolton, Illinois, illustrates 
this challenge. As an NPR investigation revealed, some police 
departments in the Chicago suburbs are so cash-strapped that they cannot 
pay for officer training, they cannot afford to fully investigate police 
shootings, they can only afford to pay police officers the equivalent of 
“fast-food wages,” and they cannot afford to fire problem officers.207 
When Chief Robert Collins took over as the police chief in Dolton, he 
observed that the department had an unusually large number of officer-
involved shootings for a small department serving a community of only 
22,000 residents.208 One officer in particular had “killed one man and 
wounded three others in separate shootings.”209 Before this officer joined 
the Dolton police force, he was suspended by another department for a 
similar shooting and fired by another department for professional 
misconduct.210 While this background may disqualify him from many 
policing jobs, “for cash-strapped suburbs like Dolton, it made him 
 
 202. Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2020) (on file with authors).   
 203. Id. at *6. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *31–36 (providing a detailed analysis of how wandering officers more frequently 
end up in communities of color and in smaller offices with less resources). 
 206. Id. at *36–45 (offering a detailed and rigorous empirical analysis of the likelihood of 
future apparent misconduct by and disciplinary action against wandering officers). 
 207. Smith, supra note 89. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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affordable.”211 That is because financially distressed communities with 
small policing budgets cannot afford the roughly $140,000 it costs to hire, 
train, and compensate a new police officer during his first year on the 
job.212 Instead, these underfunded agencies are often forced to pay their 
officers far less—some less than an entry-level employee at the local 
Walmart—and go without the same level of academy or in-service 
training.213 
This problem is compounded by the fact that some states, like Illinois, 
do not permit the decertification of officers for mere professional 
misconduct. Instead, Illinois requires that an officer be convicted of a 
felony or one of a handful of misdemeanor offenses before the officer can 
be decertified.214 In many other states, mere commission of an act of 
professional misconduct, even without a criminal conviction, is sufficient 
to trigger decertification.215 As a result, wandering officers in Illinois may 
remain police officers, often only employable at agencies that have 
insufficient funding to hire more qualified officers. Thus, simply 
defunding police departments may have perverse and unintended 
consequences. As long as other agencies are offering comparatively 
higher wages and better working conditions, defunded police 
departments may be unable to hire or keep qualified officers. Instead, 
these defunded police departments may be forced to hire individuals 
willing to work for such comparatively lower compensation—including 
wandering officers that have proven themselves unfit for the 
responsibilities of public police work. 
E.  Private Policing 
Another potential impact of defunding local law enforcement is the 
shifting of private security forces into the business of public safety. 
Again, this shift is unlikely to affect all communities equally. In 
numerous cases, when local governments do not adequately invest in 
public police, wealthy residents fill this gap by investing in private 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/6.1(a) (2019), amended by H.B. 2591, 101st Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2019). For a detailed analysis on decertification, see generally Roger L. Goldman, A Model 
Decertification Law, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 147 (2012).  
 215. See Goldman, supra note 214, at 151; see also Roger L. Goldman, NDI: Tracking 
Interstate Movement of Decertified Police Officers, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/ndi-tracking-decertified-police-officers [https://perma.cc/ 
G5XM-R5NR] (discussing how officers travel between states to avoid one state’s decertification 
decision); Candice Norwood, Can States Tackle Police Misconduct with Certification Systems?, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/police-mis 
conduct-decertification/522246 [https://perma.cc/7UBV-CQTV] (describing the importance of 
certification laws in addressing the broader problem of police misconduct). 
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security services. This leaves poorer residents, and often communities of 
color, underserved compared to their wealthier counterparts.  
Take the example of Oakland, California. Back in 2013, the city was 
reeling from a 24% increase in robberies and a 45% increase in armed 
robberies.216 But in the wake of the recession, the city was financially 
limited in the resources that it could allocate to the police department.217 
Oakland ultimately lost around 200 officers, resulting in an understaffed 
police force that lacked the manpower to respond to all reports of criminal 
activity.218 In response, a number of wealthier communities in Oakland 
began investing in private security forces to patrol their neighborhoods.219 
This was not the first time that Oakland turned to private security to 
supplement an underfunded local police force. Four years earlier, the 
Oakland City Council approved the hiring of the private security agency 
International Services Inc. to patrol some crime-plagued 
neighborhoods.220 While Oakland paid an average of $250,000 annually 
to cover the salary and benefits for each public police officer, it could 
afford to hire four private security patrolmen for only $200,000 each 
year.221 Other cities such as New Orleans have similarly invested in 
cheaper private security forces when faced with budget shortfalls.222  
This shift from public to private policing in the face of underfunding 
comes with several serious drawbacks. First, the move towards private 
policing exacerbates inequality. In the above Oakland example, residents 
received drastically different public-safety services based in part on their 
socioeconomic status. Poorer residents had to rely on an underfunded 
police department—one that does not even have the manpower to respond 
to many types of criminal offenses—as their primary provider of public-
safety services. Wealthier residents, though, could afford to invest in 
 
 216. Richard Gonzales, With Robberies Up, Oakland Residents Turn to Private Cops, NPR 
(Nov. 15, 2013, 3:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/11/15/245213687/with-robberies-up-
oakland-residents-turn-to-private-cops [https://perma.cc/3PC5-S6CD]. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (“[T]he Oakland Police Department has been hamstrung by the loss of more than 
200 officers and can't respond to all the calls it receives for help.”). 
 219. Will Kane, More in Oakland Relying on Private Security, SFGATE (Sept. 14, 2013, 9:54 
PM), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/More-in-Oakland-relying-on-private-security-48153 
36.php [https://perma.cc/7E9D-GLFH] (telling the story of “dozens of private security officers 
hired by residents across Oakland to supplement—if not replace—a depleted, overwhelmed police 
force”). 
 220. Bobby White, Cash-Strapped Cities Try Private Guards Over Police, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
21, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027127337237011 [https://perma.cc/ 
JK8X-SGU2]. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. (explaining that New Orleans began permitting “armed private patrols since 1997, 
when residents in an east New Orleans community petitioned Louisiana’s Legislature to create a 
tax on property owners to pay for” the measure and noting that, at the time of the publication, 
around 100 private guards worked in the area).  
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private security forces to supplement the underfunded local law 
enforcement. Second, the move towards private policing transfers 
everyday public-safety services to private security officers that are 
generally poorly trained and inadequately regulated compared to their 
public counterparts. As one study found, while some classes of private 
police commonly take on many of the same everyday policing 
responsibilities as public police officers—use of force in self-defense, 
detention of suspects, and searches of property—they commonly face 
minimal licensing requirements and few regulations.223 Perhaps most 
notably, that study found that even states with robust regulations of 
private police officers still typically required no more than forty hours of 
total training.224 
Among all of the hypothesized negative side effects of defunding the 
police, this may be the most challenging one to empirically evaluate in 
the future given the lack of a cross-jurisdictional database on the 
frequency with which each local community relies on private security 
forces. Nevertheless, the theory, accompanied by the anecdotal evidence, 
is worthy of serious consideration. 
III.  REIMAGINING POLICE FUNDING 
Supporters of defunding or abolishing American police have made 
powerful arguments in favor of moving scarce governmental resources 
away from the criminal justice system generally, and policing 
specifically, and reallocating them towards education and community 
development.225 Given the racially imbalanced consequences of police 
misconduct and overcriminalization, these calls are compelling.226 But as 
this Article has shown, disinvestment from policing also presents some 
potential drawbacks that policy makers must seriously consider. In many 
jurisdictions, underfunding rather than overfunding of police 
departments—particularly the underfunding of officer salaries, training, 
oversight mechanisms, and disciplinary systems—likely contribute to 
systemic patterns of misconduct. And much of this underfunding is 
seemingly the result of the existing inequality across different 
geographical spaces. Defunding police, and reallocating these funds to 
 
 223. See generally Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 
159 (2012) (coding state regulations of private police and providing analysis on how private police 
regulations differ from public regulations). For more detailed and important evaluations of the 
private police in the United States, see generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private 
Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the 
State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357 (2006); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private 
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004). 
 224. Rushin, supra note 223, at 191 (listing Alaska, California, and Florida as three states 
that required a full forty hours of training before licensure of a private police officer). 
 225. Mock, supra note 32; Invest-Divest, supra note 33. 
 226. See, e.g., Dixon et al., supra note 129, at 542–43. 
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other community initiatives, may be a viable path forward in 
communities that currently overinvest in policing services, particularly 
those with relatively low crime, a high number of police officers per 
capita, and a relatively robust officer-accountability system. However, 
the Authors are skeptical that defunding is a viable policy solution for 
many police departments in the United States that struggle to pay officers 
livable wages and employ limited or no substantial accountability 
systems. Defunding or disinvesting from these agencies may exacerbate 
patterns of officer misconduct rather than remedy them, for the reasons 
discussed in Part II. And in these communities, further disinvesting from 
policing may even prevent police from employing policing strategies that 
could influence crime rates or improve public safety.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that society must accept the existing 
inequality as an inevitability. This Article argues that states can and 
should fundamentally reimagine how they fund the police. Rather than 
relying primarily on state and local tax dollars to fund local police 
departments, states should view policing as a public good that ought to 
be equitably distributed across the population according to need. Just as 
some state legislatures have passed revenue-sharing initiatives designed 
to equalize the availability of public goods such as education, so too 
should states act to equalize the funding of local police departments 
according to need.  While there are many similar laws that this Article 
could have focused on in this analysis, the so-called Robin Hood tax-
recapture law employed in Texas to ensure equitable funding of local 
school districts may serve as a rough blueprint for communities seeking 
to reimagine police funding.227 Creating a police funding plan that 
mirrors the Texas recapture law would ensure that all localities have 
minimally sufficient resources to investigate crime and promote public 
safety regardless of the strength of the local tax base. This would also 
ensure that economically marginalized communities are not forced to 
allocate such a comparatively large portion of their general expenditures 
towards policing services relative to other local services. This, in turn, 
would likely leave these communities with additional funds to spend on 
delivering community services. 
Additionally, to ensure the quality of policing services, states should 
require that each local police department earmark a specified portion of 
its budget for officer training and accountability. This would ensure that 
police departments use this new equitable-funding model in a manner that 
balances the coercive nature of policing with the need for proper 
community oversight of policing tactics. Combined, these regulations of 
police funding could ensure that localities have sufficient resources to 
 
 227. See infra Section III.A (describing the origins of the Texas recapture law).  
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promote the public good without drawing limited resources away from 
other community initiatives. 
A.  Educational Tax-Recapture Programs as a Blueprint for 
Police Funding 
The Texas Robin Hood tax-recapture law228 for the funding of local 
education represents a potential blueprint for this Article’s plan. The 
circumstances that led to the passage of this law closely resemble the 
current circumstances surrounding the funding of local police 
departments. Much as most localities across the country currently fund 
their police department through general fund expenditures raised by local 
property and sales taxes, Texas similarly relied on this type of funding 
strategy to support its school systems before its passage of the recapture 
law.229 This reliance on local property taxes, in particular, led to massive 
disparities in the amount of resources available to each school district 
within Texas. In the years leading up to the Robin Hood law’s enactment, 
the wealthiest district in Texas had around $14,000,000 in property 
wealth per student, compared to only $20,000 in property wealth per 
student in the poorest district in the state.230 And the 300,000 students in 
the poorest communities had less than 3% of the state’s property wealth, 
compared to the 300,000 students in the wealthiest school districts that 
controlled around 25% of the state’s property wealth.231 These disparities 
in wealth meant that poorer districts had to levy higher taxes to raise even 
a fraction of the same amount of resources as the wealthier school 
districts.232 For example, the poorest 100 districts had to tax property at 
an average of $0.745 per $100 of valuation just to raise around $2,978 
per student, while the wealthiest 100 districts had to levy taxes of only 
around $0.47 per $100 to raise around $7,233 per student.233 Put 
differently, before the tax-recapture law in Texas, poor communities had 
to tax their residents at higher rates and spend a higher percentage of their 
general funds on schooling, yet they were still unable to provide 
anywhere near the same education for their residents as the wealthier 
 
 228. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (West 2019) (repealed 2019). 
 229. See Aliyya Swaby, Many See “Robin Hood” as a Villain. But Lawmakers Rely on It to 
Pay for Schools, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/01/ 
31/texas-robin-hood-recapture-villain-texas-fix-school-finance [https://perma.cc/6UP7-6FMC] 
(describing how schools are funded in large part via property taxes in Texas and how the prior 
system contributed to inequality). 
 230. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. at 393. 
 233. Id. 
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districts. This resulted in massive inequality in educational facilities, 
teacher pay, student-to-teacher ratios, and more.234 
In 1989, in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,235 the 
Texas Supreme Court held that this sort of system for funding local 
school districts violated the Texas Constitution.236 The Texas 
Constitution states: 
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the 
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall 
be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and 
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of 
an efficient system of public free schools.237 
Based on the above findings, the court held that the Texas system 
failed to provide students with an “efficient” system that promoted the 
“general diffusion of knowledge.”238 And it held that to remedy this lack 
of equal access to general education, the state must ensure that 
“districts . . . have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil 
at similar levels of tax effort” to ensure that “[c]hildren who live in poor 
districts and children who live in rich districts [are] afforded a 
substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.”239 
The recapture law known colloquially as the Robin Hood law was the 
Texas legislature’s response to Edgewood and subsequent similar 
cases.240 The current version of the law guarantees every school district a 
set amount of money (currently set at $5,140 per student).241 On top of 
this, schools can receive additional resources per student based on 
“geographic factors” like the local cost-of-living adjustments to account 
for the differences in costs between large cities and smaller rural areas.242 
The Texas law allocates additional money to school districts that service 
 
 234. See Christie Bybee, What to Know About the ‘Robin Hood’ School Funding System, 
AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:46 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/2018 
1213/what-to-know-about-robin-hood-school-funding-system [https://perma.cc/SG2J-S6VU]. 
 235. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
 236. Id. at 393–94. 
 237. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 238. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394–96 (walking through the history of the term “efficient,” 
disregarding claims that efficiency suggests cost effectiveness and, instead, concluding that the 
intent in passing this portion of the Texas Constitution was to ensure a “general diffusion of 
knowledge” across the state). 
 239. Id. at 397. 
 240. See id. at 394; Swaby, supra note 229. 
 241. Aliyya Swaby, Texas’ School Finance System is Unpopular and Complex. Here’s How 
It Works., TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/02/15/texas-
school-funding-how-it-works [https://perma.cc/32HK-BJR4]. 
 242. Id. 
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lower-income students and students with disabilities.243 The law also 
establishes minimums for local property taxes—currently set at around 
$1 per $100 of property value—to ensure that, even in wealthy districts, 
taxpayers are allocating a similar percentage of their assessed property 
value towards public education.244 When this minimum tax threshold 
results in excess revenue in wealthier districts (that is, when it results in 
an amount greater than the $5,140 per student mandated by the state law), 
this money is then redistributed to poorer districts to ensure that they have 
similar resources per student as the wealthier districts.245  
For instance, consider the Austin Independent School District (AISD). 
As property values have skyrocketed between 2014 and 2018, the city has 
taken in significantly more property-tax revenue.246 But since the student 
population has stayed relatively flat, much of this new property-tax 
revenue has not gone to Austin schools but has instead been redistributed 
to poorer school districts around the state.247 Conversely, in poorer 
communities like the Boles Independent School District (BISD), the 
schools rely primarily on money obtained from wealthier school districts 
such as Austin.248 Without this Robin Hood plan in place, wealthier 
communities like AISD could levy far lower property taxes on their 
residents and obtain significantly more revenue per student than poorer 
communities like BISD. Were this the case, AISD would also have far 
more resources left over to spend on other community services than 
Boles. This would seemingly result in, as the court posited in Edgewood, 
“a cycle of poverty” for communities like BISD, “from which there is no 
opportunity to free themselves.”249 
The challenges facing Texas before the implementation of the Robin 
Hood tax-recapture law closely resemble the current challenges facing 
American policing. Like Texas schools before the recapture plan, 
American policing is currently marred by widespread inequality. Because 
most jurisdictions rely heavily on revenue generated from local taxes to 
fund local policing, wealthier communities with fewer public-safety 
concerns can often afford to levy similar or even lower taxes to acquire 
higher amounts of revenue. This exacerbates inequality, leaving wealthy 
areas with more resources to allocate to community services other than 
policing as compared to many poorer areas.  
 
 243. Id. (noting that “districts receive an additional 20 percent for each low-income student” 
but “these calculations haven’t been adjusted in decades”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id.  
 246. See Swaby, supra note 229. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). 
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The Authors believe that this kind of recapture and redistribution 
program is both feasible and normatively desirable. First, this proposal 
appropriately recognizes public safety and law enforcement as public 
goods that ought to be distributed across a population according to need, 
not according to ability to pay—even if there is no comparable 
constitutional right to public safety in the same way that many states have 
established constitutional rights to free public education. Professor 
Tracey L. Meares has persuasively made a similar argument. She has 
claimed that the United States should “recenter policing’s fundamental 
nature as a public good.”250 As she explains, society generally thinks of 
goods such as public infrastructure (for example, highways and public 
water supplies) as public goods—meaning that “anyone can enjoy [these 
goods] without diminishing their supply, and no one . . . can be excluded 
[from these goods] even if they” are not able to afford them.251 As Meares 
argues, “[d]isadvantaged communities ought not give up policing any 
more than they should give up public schools, electricity, or water.”252 
Nevertheless, Meares is careful to emphasize that “policing” does not just 
include the public-safety services delivered by law enforcement, like the 
investigation of and response to criminal acts. Policing as a public good 
should also include “better training of police, attention to community 
policing, caring for the most vulnerable, focusing on officer safety and 
wellness, and ensuring accountability and oversight of police.”253 To the 
extent that one views high-quality, professional policing as a public good, 
this Article’s data makes it clear that this public good is not equally 
available to all residents of the United States—due in large part to the 
wide funding disparities that currently exist across agencies. As a 
normative policy matter, this seems undesirable and inconsistent with 
how society treats other public goods. 
Second, this Article’s proposal would help communities address 
evolving criminal justice needs in a manner that does not greatly reduce 
the availability of resources for other community services. Take as an 
example the evidence uncovered by a recent report issued by The Center 
for Popular Democracy et al.254 In its analysis, it found that Oakland, 
California, spends $594 per capita on policing, which amounts to 41.2% 
of its general fund expenditures.255 By contrast, further south in the same 
state, Los Angeles spends only $381 per capita on policing, which 
 
 250. Tracey L. Meares, Policing: A Public Good Gone Bad, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2017), http:// 
bostonreview.net/law-justice/tracey-l-meares-policing-public-good-gone-bad [https://perma.cc/ 
6LDA-24K4]. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37. 
 255. Id. at 2. 
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amounts to a mere 25.7% of its general fund expenditures.256 These 
differences in the amount spent on policing per capita are, at least in part, 
likely the consequence of the different public-safety challenges that each 
city faces. In 2017, Oakland experienced around 1,299 violent crimes and 
5,983 property crimes per 100,000 residents.257 By comparison, Los 
Angeles reported only 761 violent crimes and 2,536 property crimes per 
100,000 residents—meaning that Oakland faced violent and property 
crime rates that were 71% and 136% higher, respectively, than Los 
Angeles.258 To manage these public-safety challenges, Oakland is forced 
to allocate a higher percentage of its general fund expenditures towards 
policing than Los Angeles, leaving even less resources for other social 
services that might further alleviate crime.  
But what if California adopted a recapture program, similar to that 
used in Texas to fund schools, to redistribute a portion of local tax 
revenue to the support of local law enforcement across the state? This 
recapture program could ensure that both police departments have a 
similar amount of resources per capita to provide public-safety services. 
The law could require that cities such as Oakland with greater needs for 
public-safety services because of their underlying crime rates have more 
resources per capita compared to lower crime communities. And by 
forcing municipalities to share the burden of funding local law 
enforcement across the state, such a law could ensure that both Oakland 
and Los Angeles spend a comparable amount of their respective budgets 
on public safety, leaving adequate resources for other social services. 
Third, having the state collect and redistribute public-safety funds in 
the manner that this Article describes would also give the state a natural 
lever to force jurisdictions to allocate these resources in a manner that 
does not just promote the coercive enforcement of criminal laws but also 
promotes legitimacy through the supporting of officer-accountability 
efforts. For example, the state could regulate how jurisdictions receiving 
recapture and redistributed property tax money use these resources. The 
state could set minimum salaries to ensure that poorer police departments 
could stay competitive with richer communities in attracting top talent to 
their police departments. The state could also mandate that each 
jurisdiction receiving these funds allocate a specified percentage of them 
towards training, internal affairs, and other officer-accountability efforts. 
This would avoid the limitations of the current funding model, where 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Table 8, California: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City, 2017, FBI: UCR 
(2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-8/table-8-
state-cuts/california.xls [https://perma.cc/B893-M285] (using the population and crime numbers 
listed for Oakland, California, to calculate). 
 258. Id. (using the population and crime numbers listed for Los Angeles, California, to 
calculate). 
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some police departments barely have the resources to keep officers on the 
streets (let alone invest in additional training and oversight) while well-
resourced departments have an extensive ability in these enterprises. And 
while, admittedly, forced investment into accountability apparatuses is no 
guarantee that the department will implement them effectively, it would 
at least force jurisdictions to properly fund these activities. This would be 
an important and necessary first step in promoting officer accountability 
within these organizations.  
B.  Potential Drawbacks 
This Article’s proposal would obviously come with some significant 
drawbacks that states must consider before implementing it. First, as seen 
in Part I, massive inequality exists not just in police departments within 
states but also from one state to the next. For example, as seen in Figures 
1 and 2, portions of the Deep South, Upper Plains, and Appalachia appear 
to have concentrated pockets of comparatively low funding of local law 
enforcement. And entire states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia appear to generally allocate less 
money to officer salaries and other police expenditures. This proposal for 
a state-level recapture and redistribution of local tax dollars to equalize 
funding according to need would presumably do little good if an entire 
state suffers from a lack of wealth and adequate funding. This is a 
legitimate critique and a potential weakness of this proposal. It would 
certainly not resolve all of the inequality currently present in the funding 
of local police departments. Ultimately, the U.S. Constitution does not 
provide any obvious avenue by which Congress could easily resolve these 
funding inequalities. While Congress has the power to regulate local 
police departments when their behavior runs afoul of the U.S. 
Constitution, the funding of local policing remains a state and local 
prerogative.  
And even if this Article’s proposal cannot remedy the large-scale 
imbalances in funding between states, it can, at minimum, alleviate some 
of the inequality that exists between agencies within the same state. 
Further, the federal government does have some limited tools that it can 
use to remedy inequality in funding between police departments. As 
Professor Rachel Harmon has described in detail, the federal government 
currently administers numerous grant programs that provide limited 
funding to local police departments.259 If Congress deems the inequality 
in police funding between states to be a sufficiently serious problem as to 
warrant federal action, it could always increase federal grants to 
 
 259. See generally Harmon, supra note 39 (providing a thorough summary of how the federal 
government currently funnels some money and resources into local police departments through 
various grant programs).  
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underfunded police departments.260 Nothing in this Article’s proposal 
keeps Congress from taking such action. Of course, such federal 
assistance could come with its own limitations. Recipients of federal 
grants may eagerly accept the federal assistance but thereafter simply 
reallocate existing resources to other important needs (for example, 
schools, infrastructure, or community services), leaving the local law 
enforcement agency roughly equally situated as before the grant. But this 
reshuffling of funding may ultimately result in poorer communities 
having additional resources for community services, as many 
abolitionists and defunding supporters have requested.  
Second, localities may find this level of financial regulation unduly 
coercive, leaving local communities with little autonomy in deciding how 
to allocate their resources to best serve their communities. This is a 
legitimate concern that can be remedied. For example, in implementing 
the education recapture law in Texas, the state permits school districts to 
request voter approval locally to increase property taxes from $1.04 per 
$100 of property value (the usual cap under the law) to as high as $1.17 
per $100 of property value if the school district chooses to fund additional 
programs or extracurriculars.261 This means that, while property taxes are 
typically capped and redistributed among school districts according to 
need, the law still provides some avenues for communities to 
democratically choose to increase their expenditures on certain 
educational programs. It is easy to imagine states crafting a similar 
compromise for local police department funding under this Article’s 
proposal. While states could establish set property and sales tax levels 
that will be redistributed among all jurisdictions according to their public-
safety needs, states could also allow some limited experimentation for 
communities to raise additional revenues to address unique local needs, 
experiment with new technologies, or make other investments that local 
officials deem necessary or important.  
Third, this Article’s proposed requirement that communities allocate 
a specified percentage of their policing budget to training and 
accountability may face significant local pushback. However, even if 
states opt against this portion of the proposal, there are other ways that 
states could accomplish these same goals in a manner that may seem less 
coercive than micromanaging local budgets. In addition to equalizing 
funding, states could take a more active role in mandating both academy 
and in-service training of police. They could regulate minimum 
 
 260. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using 
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 391–94 
(2011) (providing a detailed plan for how Congress could use its spending power to increase 
investments into local police departments in a manner that promotes officer-accountability 
efforts).   
 261. Swaby, supra note 241. 
52
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/3
2020] POLICE FUNDING 329 
 
acceptable salaries for law enforcement officers. They could make it 
easier to decertify officers that have been terminated because of 
professional misconduct.262 They could rollback some portions of their 
law enforcement officer bills of rights or equivalent statutes that impede 
accountability efforts.263 They could limit the scope of collective 
bargaining to prevent municipalities from bargaining away the ability to 
investigate, discipline, and fire officers found responsible for 
professional misconduct.264 And they could mandate impartial 
investigations of officer misconduct and the use of deadly force.265 No 
doubt, there are numerous ways that states could force local police 
departments to more seriously prioritize police accountability relative to 
other law enforcement prerogatives. Regardless of pushback, forcing 
departments to allocate the requisite resources towards accountability 
may ultimately prove to be one of the most effective ways to ensure that 
agencies properly prioritize these objectives.  
CONCLUSION 
Demands by civil rights activists to defund the police ought to be 
taken seriously. In many communities, every local tax dollar that goes to 
policing is a tax dollar that is no longer available for schools and other 
government services. When many police departments appear to use these 
resources in a manner that disproportionately harms communities of 
color, defunding may seem like the only remaining option. But as this 
Article illustrates, policy makers should resist this urge. Adequate 
funding is necessary for high-quality policing. By defunding police 
departments, communities would likely impair the ability of the police 
departments to control crime. Defunding would hurt police-
accountability efforts by leaving fewer resources to train, oversee, or 
discipline officers. With fewer resources, police departments may seek 
additional revenue through potentially harmful means such as excessive 
ticketing or civil asset forfeitures. And defunded agencies may ultimately 
lower officer salaries, thereby limiting recruitment of qualified personnel 
 
 262. See Goldman, supra note 214, at 150–53. 
 263. See generally Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police 
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 185 (2005) (coding all fourteen law enforcement officer bills of rights in existence at the 
time and noting at various times how these laws can frustrate accountability). 
 264. See generally Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2017) 
(arguing for more transparency in collective bargaining negotiations or, alternatively, limiting the 
scope of subjects up for bargaining to prevent cities from negotiating away basic accountability 
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and contributing to disciplinary shifting. While the urge to defund police 
departments is understandable, these potential drawbacks ought to give 
policy makers significant reservations before undertaking widespread 
defunding efforts. Ultimately, it seems that you get what you pay for. And 
if you can’t pay for much, you don’t get much. Elsewhere, society 
generally recognizes that underfunded institutions tend to underperform. 
For example, poor schools with underpaid teachers, missing staff, and 
crumbling facilities will likely underperform compared to their richer 
peers. Police departments are likely no different.  
Nevertheless, as this Article outlines, the current approach to funding 
local police departments is broken. By relying on local property and sales 
taxes, the current system has produced massive inequality in police 
funding. This forces some poorer communities to levy higher taxes and 
allocate a higher percentage of their general funds towards policing, 
leaving fewer scarce resources to invest in other government services. We 
believe that our proposal to equalize the funding of local police 
departments according to need more appropriately recognizes policing as 
a public good. And this Article’s proposal to require municipalities to 
earmark specific percentages of these recaptured and redistributed tax 
dollars for officer accountability would help ensure that all communities 
have not just equal access to policing services but high-quality policing 
services. This would likely ensure that localities have sufficient resources 
to provide high-quality policing without drawing limited resources away 
from other community initiatives. 
Ultimately, though, this Article’s aim is not to end a debate but to start 
it. The Authors hope that this Article is just the beginning of a broader 
conversation about the importance of equitable police funding.  
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